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Executve summary 
The international policy context and circumstances of 
development action and humanitarian relief have changed 
profoundly over the past two decades, with aid agencies now 
operating in an increasingly diverse array of conflict-affected 
contexts that are also considered by Western governments 
as major threats to international peace and security. A new 
and aggressive phase of direct international engagement 
and liberal interventionism in so-called ‘fragile states’ has 
assigned a new strategic role to aid as a key component 
of ‘comprehensive’ efforts to change and transform whole 
societies, and has created powerful incentives for aid agencies 
to be present and operational in insecure environments.
This is reflected in the rapid expansion of the aid industry at 
every level – geographical reach, funding, the number and 
variety of organisations involved and the range and complexity 
of their activities across overlapping and competing operational 
and policy areas, which have blurred the lines between the 
many different types of contractors and service providers 
involved. Aid agencies have inevitably experienced the friction 
and tensions this can engender, including their exposure 
to insecurity and other risks to a degree that is probably 
unprecedented, prompting substantial new investment in 
security management and a proliferation of security-related 
networks, inter-agency platforms, joint UN/NGO initiatives, 
good practice guides and security-related consultancy work.
One consequence of the raft of security initiatives has 
been the progressive withdrawal of many international aid 
personnel into fortified aid compounds, secure offices and 
residential complexes, alongside restrictive security and travel 
protocols. This ‘bunkerisation’ has contributed to the growing 
physical and social detachment of many international aid 
personnel from the societies in which they work, and a 
substantial shift towards ‘remote management’ techniques as 
aid managers attempt to administer or evaluate programmes 
from a safe distance, through national and local field workers, 
subcontracted intermediaries and new technologies. UN 
agencies and larger NGOs have also sought to circumvent 
their own security restrictions by outsourcing activities to 
other NGOs and for-profit subcontractors. 
In practice, maintaining institutional or personal presence 
in challenging environments depends on resolving the basic 
tension between accepting risks and remaining safe. Access 
and presence may have been achieved, but only on certain 
conditions and frequently at the risk of creating, accepting 
or ignoring other significant risks and hazards, including the 
securitisation of aid delivery, the development of unequal 
hierarchies of protection and access and the transfer of risk 
to the margins of the aid establishment. The remoteness of 
international aid staff can also weaken strategic engagement 
and decision-making, undermine acceptance and compromise 
the ability to effectively report on and monitor programmes. 
Such detachment can also create self-referential social worlds, 
with their own internal hierarchies, competition and distrust.
Recognising that these hazards cannot be easily eliminated, 
this study points to the need for a broadened risk agenda 
that includes the management of security risks, but that also 
links directly to other aspects of agencies’ programmatic and 
strategic risk management. This calls for debate and discussion 
that openly acknowledges the often irresolvable nature of 
the hazards and contradictions that aid actors face when 
engaging in conflict-affected countries. This report does not 
intend to paint an unwarranted negative picture: aid agencies 
get much right in environments that are unquestionably 
challenging and difficult. The purpose of this discussion is to 
broaden and deepen the risk agenda beyond the immediate 
preoccupations of operational security risk management. This 
inevitably entails a focus on the difficulties and dilemmas of 
engagement more than on its positive achievements.
• poor contextual knowledge and analyss and weak 
nformaton base to support programmng and decson-
makng
Aid agencies are weak on contextual understanding and analy-
sis to support their programming in conflict-affected countries. 
The reasons for this are often attributed to the ostensibly short-
term nature of humanitarian action, a failure to invest sufficient 
resources to support better information-gathering and analysis, 
the absence of suitable research tools and analytical frameworks 
and agencies’ failure to incorporate what contextual information 
and analysis they do have into their planning and programming. 
Yet the findings of this project suggest that the problem is 
actually more to do with the behaviour and culture of aid actors. 
The physical and social distancing of many aid personnel from 
the local human and political context not only creates barriers 
to security hazards and threats, but also makes it difficult for 
them to appreciate or understand the people and societies that 
they are engaged with. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects 
of the current security risk agenda and the approaches that it 
encourages is the extent to which these are focused on the risks 
for agencies themselves, rather than risks to civilians within the 
host population. 
Without investing in more systematic approaches to context 
analysis, a common default position is instead to claim reliance 
on the supposedly superior situational knowledge of national 
and local staff. In challenging environments, a national aid 
worker’s ethnic or cultural background is frequently seen 
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as giving them an insider’s view of local power dynamics; 
equally, though, it can easily translate into fears of bias and 
susceptibility to community pressure. Many agencies also rely 
on security-related information and ‘intelligence’. This stream 
of security data and alerts can clutter, obscure and complicate 
analysis of complex security environments. While the level 
of detail contained in security reports does not necessarily 
correlate with increased accuracy in prediction, it does serve 
to reinforce the perception of a constant and active threat, 
potentially fuelling paranoia or, conversely, desensitising the 
target audience to real threats. 
• Weakened relatons and engagement wth clent 
populatons and external stakeholders and heghtened 
rsks of dong harm
In theory, the larger established international aid agencies have 
long recognised the importance of understanding and managing 
their relations with external stakeholders. Yet, in practice, the 
main rationales for agencies analysing and engaging with other 
actors often appear limited to the imperatives of achieving or 
improving access, staff security and local aid delivery. This risks 
eclipsing attempts to properly comprehend or account for the 
implications and impacts of agencies’ actions and activities. 
Whilst an aid agency may be valued or ‘accepted’ by certain 
power-holders, this does not necessarily mean that all members 
of the community are happy, and relations at community level 
are likely to be strained and volatile. 
The greater the distance and detachment of senior aid 
personnel and the greater their ignorance of local political and 
social realities on the ground, the greater the risk that their 
agencies or partners will do harm through their engagement 
and relationships with external stakeholders. Where the 
objectives of aid interventions are to alter or ‘stabilise’ 
the social and political order in the interests of peace- or 
statebuilding, the potential liabilities associated with weak, 
distorted or biased relationships with external stakeholders 
are particularly acute. These hazards are compounded by 
the increasingly common practice among UN and other 
international agencies of devolving or outsourcing access 
negotiations and strategies to partners, subcontractors and 
national or local staff.
• securtsed and prvatsed ad presence and delvery
The securitisation of aid has become a major defining factor 
in the operating environment of aid agencies. Attention has 
focused particularly on the assumed heightening of the security 
risks to humanitarian and other aid workers and assets resulting 
from their association with political and military elements of 
international interventions. Much less debated is the flip-side 
of aid securitisation, resulting from aid agencies’ own protective 
and deterrent security measures, including security advice 
and training from the security services and private security 
companies. While much of this market is dominated by the 
bigger international players, agencies also regularly turn to 
smaller and/or local security providers, about which they often 
know very little. Inevitably, there is the risk that such firms will 
be connected with criminal, political or armed actors. The risks 
of aid agencies inadvertently empowering criminal or armed 
groups or fuelling war economies are significant.
Kenyan WFP pilots, Bentiu, South Sudan
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• Herarches of protecton and rsk transfer wth 
remote management
Arm’s-length aid management inevitably involves the transfer 
of security risks and associated liabilities from international 
staff to national and local staff or subcontracted and partner 
organisations. Few agencies have reportedly taken steps to plan 
for when and what forms of outsourcing, remote management 
or risk transfer practices are appropriate or justified for different 
situations and contexts, and there is little discussion and no 
common framework to support decision-making. 
In practice, the means by which many aid organisations 
gain or maintain access to insecure contexts often rest on 
security arrangements that exclude the vast majority of 
their more exposed front-line implementers from access 
to the protected and exclusive aid ‘archipelago’ enjoyed 
by international personnel. Indeed, some of the most 
crucial aid implementers – including those involved in the 
logistics side of aid delivery, such as pilots and truckers 
– are not recognised as ‘aid workers’ as such by the sector’s 
international elite. Despite the fact that national and local 
personnel represent over 90% of aid workers in the field 
and consistently suffer far higher rates of security incidents 
and fatalities compared to internationals, agencies’ staffing 
policies and guidelines rarely consider the distinct threats 
faced by their national staff. National and local staff usually 
have less access to security training and protective or other 
security measures or to the security-related information 
and briefings that are provided for international personnel, 
and they are usually excluded from the additional support 
arrangements that are assumed necessary for international 
staff. Aid workers employed by local partner NGOs or other 
subcontracted entities are likely to receive even lower levels 
of security support. With the physical and social separation 
between international staff and national field staff and the 
stark differences in their relative exposure to risk and access 
to protection and other benefits comes a high potential for 
mutual resentment and mistrust.
• Weakened control of ad delvery chans and dstorted 
ad programmng and coverage
Competition for funding impels aid organisations to maximise 
their competitiveness in relation to others in order to remain 
operational and maintain a presence. Under these conditions, 
most agencies will seek to protect their bottom line, and 
construct an image of being good performers and appropriate 
implementers in order to secure funding. Competition among 
aid agencies drives a need to reduce any potentially negative 
messages, and a perception of success can be maintained 
regardless of actual programmatic impact and effect. This 
in turn undermines the capacity for lesson-learning and the 
adjustment of programmes and projects that might have had 
negative outcomes. 
Strengthening accountability for outcomes and impacts requires 
detailed understanding of the local context and transparent 
and evidence-based monitoring and assessment – both of 
which are difficult to achieve remotely. With operational aid 
activities increasingly subcontracted or outsourced, the level 
of responsibility and accountability for outcomes becomes 
increasingly unclear. Liability for negative outcomes can be 
avoided by claiming ignorance: reference to the security risks 
and obstacles involved in monitoring outcomes provides an 
alibi for not knowing; meanwhile, any vested interests in the 
status quo may seek to exaggerate the scale of the danger.
Many aid agencies’ operational programmes have been 
distorted, driven by their donors’ objectives rather than assessed 
needs on the ground. This compounds other distortions in the 
overall coverage or prioritisation of aid across different areas 
or groups resulting from security conditions and more basic 
logistical and other factors. The greater the detachment of 
donors and aid managers from the field, and the more limited 
and restricted agencies’ presence is on the ground, the higher 
the risk that these distortions will go unrecognised or ignored. 
Agencies’ actions and responses are liable to be further 
distorted by adaptations or curtailments in programme and 
project focus and objectives to suit the imperatives of security 
risk management. Food, for instance, is a lot more difficult to 
deliver through low-profile approaches than vaccines. 
Conclusons
The contradiction between the expectation that international 
aid workers accept more risks and the countervailing pressures 
to limit exposure seems irreconcilable. The organisational, 
ethical, personal and financial difficulties involved in 
working in challenging environments, and the fundamental 
tension between ‘staying’ and ‘staying safe’, suggests that 
bunkerisation and remote management are an unstoppable 
trend. The aid industry has yet to systematically discuss 
the wider implications and possible consequences of these 
trends. The tensions between organisational and individual 
risk acceptance cannot be resolved simply through recourse 
to better security management techniques. Indeed, narrowing 
the focus to supposed technical and managerial fixes risks 
drawing attention away from the more fundamental dilemmas 
and hazards that define the messy and uncertain realities of 
being present and engaged in complex security environments. 
Recognising the liabilities associated with staying and delivering 
depends on agencies adopting a broadened risk agenda that is 
not confined to the immediate preoccupations of ostensibly 
manageable security risks, but which encompasses attention to 
the host of interconnected challenges and hazards involved. 
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Since the 1990s, aid agencies have 
significantly expanded the reach 
and ambitions of their engagement 
in war-affected and chronically 
insecure fragile states, providing 
humanitarian assistance as well 
as engaging in programmes of 
social and political transformation 
led and funded by Western donor 
governments. While there has 
been some recent research into 
aid worker security, and there is a 
rapidly expanding body of work on 
good practice in risk and security 
management, there has been sur-
prisingly little research into how aid 
agencies are actually responding 
to the real or perceived security 
risks they face in these unstable 
environments. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the implications are 
significant, affecting every level 
and aspect of agencies’ presence 
and programming. However, while 
informal conversations yield many stories, actual practices 
cannot be properly assessed and examined unless these stories 
are documented (Van Brabant, 2010).
This report seeks to address this gap.1 Drawing on fieldwork 
in South Sudan and Afghanistan between late 2010 and early 
2012, it documents some of the challenges that aid workers 
and their organisations face in these difficult contexts, and 
explores the implications for programming. What aid actors tell 
themselves and others that they are or should be doing and 
what they are actually doing are often quite different things. 
Our findings challenge much of the received wisdom and 
assumptions that underpin the current mainstream discourse 
and guidance on risk and security management across the 
sector, including the presumption that aid workers and 
agencies are likely to act and behave in rational, predictable 
and principled ways in these difficult environments. In reality, 
and as the history of the aid encounter shows in countries 
such as Afghanistan and South Sudan, operating in conditions 
of chronic insecurity is a messy, uncertain and compromising 
business. Because it is so focused on the immediate 
practicalities of trying to stay physically safe while keeping 
operations going, mainstream 
risk management has so far failed 
to properly capture the higher-
level strategic and programmatic 
problems, challenges and trade-
offs that result from aid actors’ 
engagement in contexts that 
they consider to be actually or 
potentially dangerous.
This report deliberately refers 
in broad terms to ‘aid agencies’ 
and ‘aid workers’, reflecting the 
extent to which the aid sector 
encompasses a diverse array of 
international, regional, national 
and local actors engaged in a 
wide variety of interventions 
(Collinson, Elhawary and 
Muggah, 2010). The dividing 
lines between the many different 
types of contractors and service 
providers are blurred, sometimes 
deliberately so, with many 
agencies working in a variety of programming areas and 
many aid personnel rotating in and out of different types of 
organisation and across different sectors of intervention. In 
South Sudan, for instance, many international aid workers 
move between the larger ‘high-end’ international NGOs, 
UN agencies, peacekeepers and private contractors. The 
resources controlled and managed by the humanitarian aid 
sector are dwarfed by other forms of aid in these countries, 
and the numbers of agencies that can be clearly identified as 
‘humanitarian’ are relatively few. 
A key frame of reference for this study is the concept of 
humanitarian space as a social arena, as developed by 
Dorothea Hilhorst and Bram Jansen (Hilhorst and Jansen, 
2010). This space, they suggest, is best viewed as a social and 
physical arena where a variety of different actors – donors, 
UN agencies and INGOs, headquarters and field staff, aid 
recipients, local private suppliers, peacekeepers and other 
military actors – negotiate the various activities and outcomes 
associated with aid. This social negotiation ‘encompasses 
any kind of strategy, including coercive violence, written 
statements, formal interactions, schemes deployed in the 
shadows of the official process and the banalities of everyday 
gossiping’ (ibid.: 1120). The idea of the social arena is defined 
by an actor-oriented approach that assumes that people’s 
behaviour will often be reactive, irrational and unpredictable, 
that their practices are influenced by other actors and that 
Chapter 1
Introducton
UNOCHA visitors walkway, Kabul, Afghanistan
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1 This research was made possible by a two year ESRC–DFID research 
grant (RES-167-25-0439) entitled ‘Achieving Policy Coherence in Challenging 
Environments: Risk Management and Aid Culture in Sudan and Afghanistan’. 
The research was jointly managed by the Global Insecurities Centre (GIC), 
University of Bristol and the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI, London.
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they will be driven by different motives 
and in response to their subjective 
interpretation of the situation they are 
in. It recognises that action will be based 
on a range of driving forces, and that 
motivations for action will be mixed; 
humanitarian action, for instance, is 
unlikely to be based solely on a desire 
to alleviate suffering, but will also be 
driven by other motivations, such as 
organisational pressures to continue 
operations and retain staff or to 
demonstrate publicly that the agency is 
doing ‘good work’. 
This approach means paying attention to 
the ‘life-worlds’ of aid workers and the 
ways that they shape and interpret the 
reality of aid in a given context. Rather 
than being examined primarily in terms 
of its avowed policy aims, the inter-
national aid system is understood more 
as a cultural and spatial phenomenon. 
Through ethnographic observation of the 
everyday practices of different actors, it 
is possible to depict how various drivers and dynamics of aid 
delivery interact with and influence each other. How people 
define and organise their work is influenced by the mission or 
mandate of their agency, their understanding of the context 
and assessment of needs, their personal expectations and 
frustrations and the associated organisational culture (ibid., 
citing Walkup, 1997). It is also shaped by the fears and anxieties 
of international aid workers them-selves (Duffield, 2010).
The research drew on a range of ethnographic and interview-
based methodologies, including participant observation and 
conversation, in-depth and semi-structured interviews, focus 
group meetings and multi-stakeholder workshops. It aimed 
to explore how security risks are understood, negotiated and 
managed among different actors in the various interconnected 
aid arenas that they occupy or encounter, and what the 
implications of this and of enhanced risk management are 
more generally for the modalities and dynamics of aid delivery 
in high-risk contexts such as Afghanistan and South Sudan. 
The main research sites were the physical spaces occupied by 
international aid workers, located mainly but not exclusively 
in urban areas and including fortified and lower-profile aid 
compounds and offices, restaurants, hotels and various other 
recreational spaces used by international aid personnel. Away 
from these (international) urban spaces, research was conducted 
in various sites including provincial towns (restaurants and 
hotels, hospitals, NGO offices and compounds) and rural 
communities, and while travelling cross-country by road or air. 
The research encompassed conversations, interviews2 and 
participant observation with a broad range of actors connected 
in different ways with the aid sector: representatives of donor 
governments, UN agencies, secular and religious INGOs and 
national and local NGOs, civilian subcontractors and security 
firms, local service providers, peacekeepers, journalists, private 
consultants, political and security advisers, UN pilots and 
a cross-section of local people from communities receiving 
aid.3 The research was conducted entirely independently and 
without the direct support of any international organisations. 
The research on host populations’ perceptions of the aid 
industry was conducted in partnership with two local research 
institutions – in Afghanistan with the Peace Training and 
Research Organisation (PTRO), and in South Sudan with Small 
and Medium Entrepreneurship Capacity Building Consult, South 
Sudan (SMECOSS). 
With direct observations drawn from the actor-focused field 
research and supporting literature review, this report aims 
to provide a grounded account of some of the key challenges 
and dilemmas faced by aid workers and agencies in countries 
such as South Sudan and Afghanistan that, it is hoped, 
will stimulate much-needed debate on the future of aid in 
challenging environments. In framing the context of this report, 
however, it is important to note that the growing concern with 
security has highlighted the hierarchy of inequalities that 
define the aid system, in particular the pivotal distinction 
between in-country expatriate or international aid workers 
and local or national aid workers. Rather than being ethnically 
US State Department 'Safe Haven', Rumbeck, South Sudan 
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2 Approximately 200 interviews were conducted with over 80 donor, UN, NGO 
and for-profit organisations. For further details of the research methodology, 
see Annex 2.
3 Much of this has been archived with the ESRC’s Economic and Social Data 
Service (ESDA).
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or racially defined, the international identity is primarily 
contractual. Mainly recruited externally, besides US or 
European nationals, many Asian, Latin American and African 
men and women are contractually international aid workers. 
National aid workers are mostly either the local or regional 
employees of international agencies, usually recruited in-
country, or are working for national NGOs or local community 
organisations. It is estimated that internationals constitute 
just 10% of aid workers globally (Egeland et al., 2011: 31). In 
other words, in any given aid programme, nationals comprise 
the overwhelming majority.
Thus, while situations vary, the country programme of a typical 
international NGO or UN agency usually comprises a small 
minority of expatriate staff on international contracts, with 
the vast majority of the organisational workforce being locally 
recruited on national contracts. Senior in-country management 
positions are monopolised by the few internationals, while 
national personnel, besides the basic ancillary roles of drivers, 
guards, cooks and cleaners, typically occupy supporting 
management, assessment and implementing positions. 
Besides significant differences in remuneration compared to 
international arrangements, national contracts are usually 
less generous regarding health benefits, insurance, access 
to transport and security entitlements, such as evacuation 
eligibility (ibid.: 40–46). Although only a minority, international 
aid workers are also the main beneficiaries of the significant 
investment in security and risk management that has taken 
place since the 1990s. International managers commonly 
assume – sometimes incorrectly – that national staff are 
less exposed to risk than themselves (ibid.). In challenging 
environments, a national aid worker’s ethnic or cultural 
background is frequently seen as giving them an insider’s view 
of local power dynamics. Equally, though, it can easily translate 
into fears of bias and susceptibility to community pressure. 
Depending on the circumstances, a national aid worker’s ethnic 
or community identity may even put them at direct risk. 
While fully cognisant of the inequalities and uneven policy focus 
within the aid system, this report is largely concerned with the 
security of aid as an ‘international’ phenomenon. The following 
section provides a brief review of the changing context of risk 
and security management as it relates to mainstream aid actors 
operating in chronically insecure environments. Paradoxically, 
while aid agencies have significantly expanded their presence 
in conflict zones, the risks that they have encountered in doing 
so have triggered the proliferation of a raft of institutional, 
managerial and architectural security measures stemming 
from insurance requirements, employer duty-of-care concerns, 
standardised security protocols and field security training that 
reflect trends in Western societies that are themselves becoming 
more risk-averse and security conscious. This has meant the 
progressive withdrawal of many international aid personnel 
into fortified aid compounds, secure offices and residential 
complexes and other forms of self-contained and privately 
guarded gated communities, alongside restrictive security 
and travel protocols covering visits to project sites, movement 
outside of defined areas, residential arrangements and evening 
curfews. In turn, this ‘bunkerisation’ has contributed to the 
growing physical and social detachment of many international 
aid personnel from the societies in which they work, and a shift 
across the aid sector towards ‘remote management’ techniques 
as senior, usually expatriate, aid managers attempt to administer 
or evaluate programmes from a safe distance, through national 
and local field workers, subcontracted intermediaries and new 
technologies. 
The third section takes a critical look at the evolving security 
risk management agenda. It highlights a shift away from risk 
avoidance to risk management that, at least at the rhetorical 
level, is intended to enable agencies to operate in dangerous 
places despite the risks (Egeland et al., 2011). The discussion 
challenges some of the basic assumptions that underpin 
this agenda, highlighting in particular the limitations of an 
approach to risk and security management that assumes that 
agencies and aid workers are willing to expose themselves 
to residual risks, and that counts on objective, rational and 
accountable decision-making and action within agencies and 
on acceptance as a reliable cornerstone of risk mitigation. 
None of these assumptions stands up to scrutiny against 
observed realities on the ground; rather than reflecting an 
ideal framework of risk management, maintaining agency 
‘presence’ in challenging environments more often depends 
on multiple compromises, contradictions and trade-offs at all 
levels, and current approaches to risk management remain 
generally ‘ad hoc, inconsistent and fragmented’ (Metcalfe, 
Martin and Pantuliano, 2011: 6).
Current discourse and received wisdom on operational risk and 
security management beg a host of critical and contentious 
questions about what it really means to be ‘present’ and 
what the ultimate objectives of this presence are. What does 
the acceptance of risk mean in practice, and what does it 
really entail to ‘stay and deliver’ in war zones and other crisis 
contexts? Is growing remoteness and a culture of anxiety 
among international aid workers an acceptable price for 
claiming presence? The fourth section looks more closely at 
some of the implications for aid agencies and their operations 
of ‘staying’ and ‘delivering’ in challenging environments, 
highlighting the significant programmatic and strategic 
hazards that can result either directly or indirectly from the 
practical measures that agencies take to avoid, manage or 
mitigate security risks. These include the securitisation of aid 
delivery, the development of unequal hierarchies of protection 
and access within the mainstream aid establishment and the 
transfer of risk to its margins, limiting the quality and scope 
of programmes and censoring advocacy and allowing control 
or manipulation of assistance by political and military actors. 
The remoteness of international aid staff can also weaken 
strategic engagement and decision-making, undermine 
acceptance and compromise the ability to effectively report on 
and monitor programmes. Such detachment can also create 
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self-referential social worlds – the aid bubble – replete with 
internal hierarchies, competition and distrust. 
Recognising that these hazards cannot be easily eliminated, 
the conclusion discusses the need for a broadened risk 
agenda that includes the management of security risks, but 
that also links this directly to other aspects of agencies’ 
programmatic and strategic risk management. This calls for 
debate and discussion that openly acknowledges the often 
irresolvable nature of the hazards and contradictions that aid 
actors face when engaging in conflict-affected countries such 
as South Sudan and Afghanistan.
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The international policy context and 
circumstances of humanitarian relief 
and development action have changed 
profoundly over the past two decades. 
Aid agencies are operating in an increas-
ingly diverse array of war-affected 
contexts that are also considered by 
Western governments as major threats 
to international peace and security. 
Based on the rationale that peace is 
impossible without development and 
development impossible without peace, 
Western preoccupations with these so-
called ‘fragile states’ have triggered 
a new and aggressive phase of direct 
international engagement seeking to 
‘stabilise’ these countries and mitigate 
the threats they pose. Integrating both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of intervention, 
both military and civilian (Collinson, 
Elhawary and Muggah, 2010), the current 
chapter of liberal interventionism has 
assigned a new strategic role to aid 
(Duffield, 2001), with the UN now an 
aligned force, if not a warring party, 
directly supporting partisan political 
groups and committed to achieving 
defined international security outcomes (DAC, 2003; Eide et 
al., 2005; Sida, 2005).
This has created powerful incentives for aid agencies to be 
present and operational in chronically insecure countries. 
During the 1990s, when the Taliban held power in Afghanistan, 
the UN mission would withdraw on the slightest provocation, 
including in one instance the throwing of a coffee pot at a 
UN official (Donini, 2009: 8, fn. 14); today, even the deaths 
of aid workers are met with a defiant resolve to remain (BBC, 
2011). Where donor governments and the UN are engaged and 
determined to stay, so too are the many international NGOs 
and consultants that subcontract for them. Those ‘fragile 
states’ deemed important to Western security are also the 
aid industry’s most profitable areas, and where the contract 
culture is most active. While aid agencies like to see their 
presence as a reflection of programmatic or humanitarian 
‘criticality’, it is also true that, to maintain market share, they 
have little choice but to follow the money (Van Brabant, 2010: 
10). For international NGOs, not having a visible presence in 
challenging environments threatens brand loyalty, weakens 
financial sustainability and raises questions about an agency’s 
capacity for humanitarian action.
The aid system has undergone unprecedented expansion 
at every level – in terms of geographical reach, funding, the 
number and variety of organisations involved and the range 
and complexity of their activities across overlapping and 
competing operational and policy areas. Official funding for 
humanitarian assistance increased from $2.1 billion at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Buchanan-Smith and Randel, 2002) to 
$12.4bn in 2010, with total recorded humanitarian assistance 
including private donations totalling an estimated $16.7bn 
in 2010 (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011); meanwhile, 
the number of field-based aid workers employed by the UN 
humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs is now thought to 
exceed 200,000 (Harvey et al., 2010). In Sudan, the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between 
the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/
Movement (SPLA/M) in 2005 saw an exponential increase 
in the number of international aid agencies in South Sudan, 
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from around 50 to 155 registered agencies by 2010, along 
with a similar number of national NGOs.4 Organisations 
are engaged in activities ranging from recovery and 
reconstruction to political stabilisation, peace-building, state-
building, humanitarian relief and development, with donors 
encouraging the integration of aid and political activities to 
create ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated’ approaches. 
As witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now increasingly 
in South Sudan, Western aid’s wider post-Cold War aim of 
‘catalysing change and transforming whole societies’ (Stiglitz, 
1998: 3) has proved more difficult than first imagined, and 
aid agencies have inevitably experienced the friction and 
tensions this can engender. While the empirical evidence is 
unclear on the extent to which, and under what conditions, 
aid work is actually becoming more dangerous (Collinson and 
Elhawary, 2012; Fast, 2010; Stoddard et al., 2006), a dominant 
narrative among aid agencies is that they are working in 
increasingly hostile and difficult operating environments, in 
which direct security threats are growing and their ability to 
act is becoming more constrained. The prevailing theme is that 
things are getting worse: agencies’ access is becoming more 
difficult, attacks on aid workers are increasing and respect 
for international humanitarian law is declining (Collinson and 
Elhawary, 2012; HERR, 2011).
Although difficult to square with the rapid and continuing 
expansion of their reach and ambitions in challenging 
environments across the world, this narrative of ‘shrinking’ 
humanitarian space nevertheless reflects the 
problems for aid programming that result from 
the insecurity and volatility of many of the 
environments in which aid actors are seeking 
to operate. The large aid presence in countries 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan and 
Somalia inevitably means that aid agencies 
are exposed – or are exposing themselves 
– to a variety of security and other risks to a 
degree that is probably unprecedented. This 
is reflected in the statistics, with reported 
aid worker casualties tripling over the last 
decade and significant increases in politically 
motivated targeted attacks, kidnappings and 
criminal acts against aid agencies and their 
personnel (Egeland et al., 2011; Metcalfe, 
Giffen and Elhawary, 2011; Stoddard et al., 
2009). 
These trends have prompted a new focus 
and substantial new investment in security 
management. The role of the dedicated 
security officer has gained new prominence, 
with the recruitment of many ex-military and 
security service personnel to these posts. 
The expansion of this security apparatus within agencies has 
been matched by the proliferation of new security-related 
networks, inter-agency platforms, joint UN/NGO initiatives, 
good practice guides and security-related consultancy work. 
Following the bombing of its offices in Baghdad in 2003, the 
UN established a new Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) and developed Minimum Operational Security 
Standards (MOSS) that set guidelines for emergency planning, 
security training, essential communications and the physical 
protection of residential and office buildings. Many agencies 
have introduced security risk management frameworks or 
adopted guidelines such as the UN’s 2009 Guidelines for 
Acceptable Risk (Egeland et al., 2011). The UN and NGOs 
have jointly sought to implement a ‘Saving Lives Together’ 
initiative to improve security collaboration between the UN 
and NGOs at field level. In January 2011, the UN launched a new 
Security Level system, designed to shift security management 
from limiting activities according to assessed risks to a new 
‘enabling’ approach focused on how to achieve programme 
goals in insecure and high-risk operating environments.
There is a tension between the tacit acceptance of risk and the 
origin of many international aid workers and organisations 
in Western societies that, themselves, are increasingly 
risk averse (Furedi, 2006; Nolan, 1998). Recruitment and 
induction activities are governed by insurance and other 
contractual imperatives that demand basic risk avoidance 
and heightened levels of direct and demonstrable protection. 
The extensive security measures that aid agencies have 
adopted since the mid-1990s is evidence of this (Bruderlein 
and Gassmann, 2006). Periodically reinforced by high-profile 
4 See the NGO Forum website: http://southsudanngoforum.org/ngos-in-
southern-sudan. 
Perimeter fence, Kabul, Afghanistan
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targeted attacks like those in 
Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
but irrespective of the extent 
that one can generalise from 
such events, the dominant 
response has been for the 
aid system to harden itself by 
stepping up protection and 
adopting stronger deterrence 
measures (Van Brabant, 2010: 
8). 
For host populations, the most 
visible impact of these measures 
has been the widespread retreat 
of international aid personnel 
into expatriate ‘green zones’ that 
are all but entirely inaccessible 
to locals and detached from 
the local social context – the 
UN and international NGO 
compounds, embassy complex-
es, secured residential units 
and leisure facilities that form 
clearly demarcated, separated 
and secured spaces (Boone, 2009; Duffield, 2010). Exclusive 
gated communities have sprung up, together with the 
spread of fortified aid compounds and, in some locations, 
the placement of aid sections within military bases. These 
compounds have come to represent a highly visible and 
separate ‘island of modernity’ that exposes the exclusivity 
of the international space and its unequal relationship with 
the surrounding environment – interconnected by exclusive 
means of transport and representing private spaces that 
mesh into what, spatially at least, could be likened to a secure 
archipelago of international aid (Duffield, 2010). In contexts 
such as South Sudan, defensive living is increasingly seen 
as the only way to operate. As one interviewee for this study 
put it: ‘You can live all your life in Juba without leaving the 
compound – go to work, exercise, shopping, partying’.5 The 
programmatic implications of these increasingly restrictive 
practices are obvious. According to one interviewee, a senior 
UN official: ‘During the war I could do all kinds of things with 
UN Security approval that I can no longer do. I was dropped 
with a radio set and a tent and stayed for weeks in the bush. 
Today no one walks, no tents. This means that we have no 
access, nor the flexibility to go to the areas where there is the 
greatest need’.6 In order to enter the UN’s logistical system 
in Sudan it is necessary for visiting HQ staff or temporary 
consultants to first pass the UN’s Basic and Advanced Security 
in the Field training modules (UNDSS, 2012). Without passing 
these modules, it is impossible to obtain a UN ID card, and 
without an ID card it is impossible to enter UN compounds, 
board UN flights or travel in UN vehicles. Likewise in Jonglei, 
for instance, the requirement 
that UN staff travel with two 
cars and always carry a satellite 
phone on patrol missions 
means that, if they follow these 
guidelines, a civilian section of 
around ten people will only be 
able to conduct one patrol at a 
time because the section is only 
likely to have one phone.7 On 
arrival in South Sudan, the first 
experience many NGO workers 
are likely to have of the UN is a 
safety course prepared by the 
UNDSS.
Politically, South Sudan is 
presented as a post-conflict 
country engaged in recovery 
and reconstruction. While this 
is partially true, many areas 
remain insecure, particularly 
along the border with Sudan 
and in areas where rebel militia 
groups are most active. One 
expatriate South Sudan analyst with many years in the country 
argued that the reason why aid agencies operating currently 
in South Sudan are so risk averse is that many came in after 
the CPA, which raised hopes of peace, stability and recovery, 
yet found themselves engaged in highly politicised and 
unstable environments. The way the country is viewed – as a 
humanitarian emergency or as a recovery context – affects the 
way security is approached, with recruitment often handled 
by HQ staff with little understanding of the socio-political and 
security context. An emphasis on development is reflected 
in the jobs section for South Sudan of the humanitarian 
website ReliefWeb, with the majority of jobs falling under the 
‘recovery and development’ banner. This is likely to signal to 
applicants that the context is safe, with the consequence that 
many aid workers arrive mentally unprepared for the actual 
conditions they find themselves in. 
The most obvious and immediate corollary to the bunkeris-
ation of international and senior personnel is remote 
management, whereby bunkered or restricted international 
aid managers transfer risk by attempting to administer 
projects at arm’s length, either through local aid workers 
(their own staff or local NGOs) or private contractors and, 
increasingly, new technologies such as GPS (Rogers, 2006; 
Huls, 2011; O’Connor, 2012; Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 
2010; IRIN, 2009; Dobbs, 2008). While in the past remote 
management represented an exception in agency practice, 
limited largely to the most severe situations of threat or 
insecurity, it is now, in various guises, a more or less typical and 
ubiquitous feature of international aid engagement in conflict-
UN convoy, Rumbeck, South Sudan
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affected countries (Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 2010; 
Steets et al., 2012; Egeland et al., 2011). The concept covers 
a variety of management and programming arrangements, 
ranging from the extreme of long-term ‘remote control’ from 
another country, as witnessed in the case of Nairobi-based 
management of international aid programmes in Somalia, 
to situations of more partial or temporary delegation of 
responsibility for programme or project implementation to 
national and local staff or partner organisations (Steets et al., 
2010; Abild, 2009). What all have in common is the reluctance 
or inability of international and senior staff to be present on 
the ground in the places where their agency’s programmes 
and projects are being implemented. 
Much effort is also being put into the development of satellite 
and telecommunications-based humanitarian remote sensing, 
together with mapping and visualisation software (Kemper 
et al., 2011; Lavers et al., 2009; Stollberg and de Groeve, 
2012). The increasing use of remote technologies as a means 
of reducing risk is an attractive proposition as it appears to 
solve many problems, including meeting aid agencies’ duty 
of care obligations, reducing field costs and limiting physical 
exposure while simulating the experience of proximity. At 
the same time, there is a certain inevitability that, with the 
growing sophistication, reliability and accessibility of these 
technologies, claims will be made that remoteness, rather 
than being a problem, actually offers new ways of engaging, 
mobilising and enfranchising aid beneficiaries (Rogers, 2006; 
Huls, 2011; O’Connor, 2012; Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 
2010; IRIN, 2009; Dobbs, 2008). 
Risk-aversion and the bunkerisation of international staff are 
considered by most commentators as a problem that particularly 
affects UN agencies owing to the UN’s political profile and 
the central orientation towards protective and deterrence 
measures, despite steps now being taken to implement a more 
flexible security system (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 2011: 
29; Egeland et al., 2011: 9; Stoddard and Harmer, 2010: 3). 
But risk-averse defensive and deterrent approaches are also 
predominant among many NGOs as well as some commercial 
service providers, as reflected in many organisations resorting 
to remote management or contracting hard protection from 
private security firms. Beyond the UN, the rapidly escalating 
number and variety of aid providers – including faith-based, 
national, local and for-profit organisations – have remained free 
to jostle for funds, access and leverage, often acting outside 
of any normative or joint operational frameworks. Thus, with 
an increasingly commercialised and competitive aid market to 
call upon, the UN agencies and larger NGOs have been able 
to circumvent their own security restrictions and conditions 
by outsourcing many key activities, such as food distribution 
and field assessment and monitoring, to smaller NGOs and for-
profit subcontractors.8 While various cross-agency initiatives 
have led to the formulation of joint standards and codes of 
conduct, such as civil–military guidelines and country-level 
initiatives to strengthen security-related information-sharing 
and coordination (e.g. the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)), 
these have generally proved too weak or too limited to ensure 
any real consistency in practice. In reality, diverse aid actors 
work with widely varying priorities and different mandates 
and missions, and their actions are often based on ideology, 
personalities or institutional interests rather than any shared 
strategies of engagement (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012; Harvey 
et al., 2010). Taken together, these developments have profound 
implications for the nature and quality of the interactions 
between international aid agencies, their national partners 
and beneficiary groups, raise many serious issues around 
accountability and have important political implications. Yet, 
up to now, there appears to have been relatively little appetite 
to acknowledge and address them or to openly scrutinise their 
repercussions for the practice of aid.
8 In Afghanistan, for example, previously UN-contracted national staffers 
have been moved to contracts with private sub-contractors such as CTG 
Global, with ‘equal or better’ conditions that allow them to operate at their 
own discretion in insecure areas. There are also examples of international 
staff operating on CTG contracts that allow them to move and live where 
they please rather than inside one of the UN’s fortified compounds (Kabul 
interviews, December 2011).
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Reflecting the many incentives and imperatives for agencies 
to remain active and operational within challenging environ-
ments, the dominant narrative of security management today 
is how to ‘stay and deliver’ (Egeland et al., 2011), with the 
priority no longer seen as avoiding risks so much as managing 
and mitigating them so that operations can continue or 
expand. This, it is argued, depends on a conscious departure 
from centralised and risk-avoiding security policies based on 
predefined risk thresholds or phases triggering automatic 
bureaucratic responses such as programme closure, agency 
withdrawal or restrictions on staff movement. To stay and 
deliver requires instead a conceptual and practical shift 
to a more resilient ‘enabling’ posture that ‘depends on 
organisations and individuals accepting a certain amount 
of risk – the risk that inevitably remains after all reasonable 
mitigation measures have been carried out’ (ibid.: 2). The 
more critical the aid programme is to people’s survival and 
wellbeing, the greater the level of risk that may be accepted. 
This, it is argued, ‘is a conscious and calculated assessment, 
intended to prevent both recklessness and risk aversion’. 
3.1 Gudance versus realtes of practce
Reflecting aid actors’ most immediate preoccupations with 
gaining and maintaining their presence or access in difficult 
environments, the problems agencies and the wider aid 
industry face in these contexts have been posed as practical 
challenges that ought to be amenable to more or less 
practical or technical solutions. The quest to remain present 
in these contexts has thus given rise to a fast-expanding 
body of practical guidance and advice that is intended to 
support and improve agencies’ security management on 
the ground. Systematic risk assessments and security 
management frameworks are deemed necessary to avoid 
otherwise subjective and unaccountable decision-making on 
the part of aid workers, which might be based on biased or 
distorted views of the possible risks and responses to them. 
A high-profile review of operational security management 
commissioned by the Humanitarian Practice Network, for 
instance, argues that organisations should conduct security 
risk assessments before starting operations in a new location, 
with the aim of weighing the level of risk in undertaking a 
programme against the benefits it brings to the population 
being helped. Noting that ‘[g]ut feeling is not good enough’, 
it advises that effective risk management needs to start 
with ‘an attempt at a disciplined and reasoned assessment’ 
conducted ‘in a structured and disciplined manner’ (HPN, 
2010: 27–28). Agencies are urged to develop and implement 
comprehensive and clearly structured security management 
frameworks through which they can determine the threshold 
of acceptable risks for the organisation and its capacities to 
manage them and, on the basis of this, develop operational 
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security strategies for specific contexts and situations (ibid.: 
8). Within this framework, risk assessments should include 
detailed and continuous context and programme analysis, 
threat and vulnerability assessments and risk analysis. 
Possible security strategies may encompass a range of risk 
mitigation and risk avoidance measures.
In terms of what can be observed, however, aspiration as 
regards recommended security risk management appears to 
have got increasingly out of step with practice. As discussed 
further below, most aid agencies have signed up to the ideal 
of gaining acceptance with communities and key stakeholders, 
rather than relying on physical protection and deterrence 
measures, yet few have implemented an active or systematic 
acceptance approach (Fast et al., 2011a and 2011b) and, in 
reality, most continue to rely to a greater or lesser extent on 
the harder forms of security management. Few agencies will 
argue with risk assessment and risk analysis models that 
advocate good context analysis, programme analysis, threat 
analysis and vulnerability analysis (HPN, 2010), but by the 
same token, very few even try to achieve this in practice. 
Identifying and branding themselves as ‘humanitarian’, many 
agencies espouse the principles of impartiality, neutrality 
and independence as essential for their security and integral 
to their access and operations more generally, and yet the 
majority are closely and often willingly tied through their 
operational engagement into the political agendas and 
associated funding of Western governments. Engaging in 
activities such as recovery, development and peace-building 
goes far beyond the core humanitarian objective of saving 
lives and alleviating suffering in crisis, and is neither politically 
neutral nor impartial (Van Brabant, 2010). Most agencies 
endorse the idea of jointly collecting and sharing information 
and analysis of contextual risks, as reflected, for instance, in 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Early Warning – Early 
Action process. Yet at field level, there is usually little in the 
way of effective platforms for information sharing. Even where 
these exist, agencies apply very different decision-making 
to the information that they have, as reflected in contrasting 
approaches to risk between ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ 
actors, with the former often assumed or expected to have a 
more cautious stance towards programmatic and institutional 
risks (Metcalfe, Martin and Pantuliano, 2011: 6). 
Perhaps most importantly, the majority of guidance is premised 
on the assumption that agencies’ decision-making will be 
rational and objective and supported by clear and dependable 
processes and pathways. In reality, however, different actors’ 
assessments of the risks and their willingness to take them 
on are always influenced by multiple and often competing 
or conflicting organisational and personal attributes and 
priorities and by differing experiences, perceptions and 
attitudes regarding the risk environment – both relating to 
the nature of the risks involved and to the likelihood of being 
exposed to them (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009; Pennings and 
Grossman, 2008). Risks are likely to be viewed and assessed 
differently away from the field (Van Brabant, 2010), with 
individual aid workers’ attitudes to security risks often quite 
different from the stance of the organisations they work for. In 
a survey of aid workers’ views on risk and security conducted 
for the 2011 Stay and Deliver study, most respondents reported 
the view that national and international staff perceive security 
differently, and that internationals tend to overestimate the 
risk (Egeland et al., 2011: 41). Key decision-makers may 
be under pressure from their superiors or donors to either 
maintain or restrict operations in situations where it is not 
clear whether the risks are acceptable or not (Metcalfe, Martin 
and Pantuliano, 2011).
Individual calculations of acceptable risk will be strongly 
influenced by personal circumstances, financial incentives, 
career or livelihood priorities or altruistic concerns. For some, 
the real or perceived dangers of aid work provide opportunities 
for positive or ‘heroic’ narratives of personal identity, with 
risk exposure providing a vector for self-discovery and self-
awareness (Duffield, 2012). For many others, however, the 
perceived threat environment engenders high levels of anxiety, 
with negative views of the security context often influenced 
directly or indirectly by field security training and the constant 
circulation of risk and security incident reports that emphasise 
multiple and pervasive risks to personal security and the 
importance of personal vigilance and risk minimisation. 
Interviews for this study revealed differing opinions as to how 
much risk aid workers should be willing to expose themselves 
to. The background of the individual, their experience, their 
family circumstances and whether they had worked in high-
risk environments previously all play a role in this decision. 
According to one senior UN officer in South Sudan, ‘it all 
comes down to individual leadership – their experience and 
exposure, willingness and commitment to the job. You’ll find 
a lot of people less experienced, less committed, more thrill-
seeking and less risk-seeking. At the end of the day, you need 
committed people on the field. If a manager is smart, he’ll look 
for people willing to rough it out’.9 
Aid workers carry a set of personal expectations regarding 
levels of comfort and security. In Afghanistan, respondents 
with the same contractor organisation expressed a range 
of views. Among some, the level of risk acceptance was 
seemingly high – sometimes apparently higher than with 
some Afghan staff – and confidence in finding solutions 
equally elevated. Respondents from a variety of organisations 
questioned an attitude of wanting to work in a war zone and 
‘be safe’. Their position was that, if an individual accepts a job 
in a risky environment, then they have to accept some level 
of risk. According to a former UN official, ‘[m]any NGO staff 
members feel they have the right to go and do what they want, 
where they want. Many of them are non-conformist by nature 
… Sometimes they also just believe in their cause and some 
are misfits’.10 One informant, a Western national responsible 
9 Bor interview, November 2012.
10 Kabul interview, April 2011.
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for an NGO’s security, commented that long-term residents 
can become complacent: ‘It’s a bit of a bell curve. The most 
inexperienced people are the ones who say “God will save 
me”. And then there are the ones who have been here so 
long that they think they are invincible – myself included. I 
am on one side of the bell curve. I feel too complacent and 
confident’. Crucially, individual assessments of risks and 
their acceptability relative to the importance or ‘criticality’ 
of the mission or operation are heavily influenced by the 
(often poor) quality of knowledge and information about the 
risk environment. No calculated decision about acceptable 
risk exposure can ever be made if the individual or agency 
concerned has little or no understanding or information about 
the risks that they face in a given situation.
Aid workers will often try to circumvent restrictive security rules 
and protocols. This may be easier for more experienced and 
more confident staff, who are able and willing to challenge the 
bureaucracy. UNMISS civilian staff described several occasions 
where they had to take difficult decisions that involved bending 
the rules. For example, while policies coming from New York 
and Juba might not allow any official contact with rebel militia 
groups, in the field UN civil affairs officers cannot ignore them: 
‘Civil affairs have to coordinate between New York, national and 
local level. If X goes to the field and one of her key interlocutors 
is a rebel leader, what do you do – you call him a chief. I call 
it bending the rules; you can’t ignore these key figures … so 
officially you may have to call him a different name, for the 
papers’ (Felix da Costa and Kalsrud, forthcoming).11 One UN 
official described how the former head of a UN agency in South 
Sudan with decades of humanitarian experience in difficult 
contexts had an enabling effect, not only for that agency but 
also for other UN agencies 
and humanitarians.12 For her, 
this was ‘a perfect example of 
how individuals can make a 
difference’ – an ‘enabler’ who 
was senior and well-respected 
enough to take decisions – 
he ‘stretched the rules’ and 
‘gave that mindset to all of us’ 
(Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, 
2012).13 
While much decision-making 
relating to security risks may 
well be conscious and calcu- 
lated, it is inevitably subjec- 
tive and often based on 
anecdotal information or 
stories (Van Brabant, 2010). 
Although many aid organis-
ations are institutionally pre-
pared and incentivised by 
reputational and financial interests to take on a greater exposure 
to security risks to sustain their presence and operations (Van 
Brabant, 2010), and although many individual aid workers 
are willing to work in uncertain and high-risk environments, 
these ‘enabling’ tendencies are in direct tension with powerful 
counter-imperatives that encourage risk-aversion. Moreover, 
the nature and level of threats and security risks that different 
aid actors face vary considerably according to their specific 
profile, activities, locations and type of engagement, as does 
the view of who is actually at risk. With the rapid expansion 
in international private security and commercial companies 
offering ‘humanitarian’ services of various kinds, the terms ‘aid 
agency’, ‘aid worker’ and even ‘NGO’ are becoming increasingly 
ambiguous, with various actors using these labels operating in 
very different ways, and some much more willing and able than 
others to take on the security risks or mitigating action required 
to work in a conflict zone. 
In reality, responses at field level are more likely to be decided 
outside of any formal security management framework. 
Indeed, it is the relatively unfettered nature of real-life security 
management and practice that, overall, has probably allowed so 
many aid agencies to operate on such an unprecedented scale 
in conflict-affected countries like South Sudan and Afghanistan. 
Relative autonomy may allow for the freedom of action that 
many agencies and individuals require in order to remain 
operational in complex and volatile contexts, enabling them to 
negotiate their own presence and pursue their own programmes 
as they see fit (Rieff, 2011; Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). 
Moreover, across varied and complex operating situations, 
no single or preordained strategy will necessarily prove more 
successful than another. As found in a recent evaluation and 
review of humanitarian access strategies in five countries 11 Malakal interview, November 2011.
12 Interview with UN official, Juba, June 2011. 
Ruins of CARE compound, Kabul, Afghanistan
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including Afghanistan and (North and South) Sudan, what 
works in one situation can be counter-productive in another, 
even if the challenges appear similar. And while principled and 
strategic action can assist agency access in many cases, this 
is not always so; in practice, staying and delivering probably 
depends more on agencies’ and aid workers’ subjective, varying 
and often unaccountable forms of adaptation and response 
to insecure environments than on any rational and structured 
frameworks of risk assessment and decision-making. 
3.2 Implementng the ‘securty trangle’
Reflecting the essentially subjective, varied and often ad hoc 
nature of agencies’ and individuals’ responses to security 
risks, implementation of the so-called ‘security triangle’ of 
acceptance, protection and deterrence approaches remains a 
fragmented affair, replete with contradictions, compromises 
and inconsistencies in principle, policy and practice between 
different agencies, individuals, contexts and approaches. This 
reflects the heterogeneous and loosely governed nature of the 
aid system (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). 
Supporting the determination to be present, the ‘acceptance’ 
approach – enabling access and presence through gaining 
consent and approval from client populations and other key 
stakeholders – is viewed by most humanitarian agencies as the 
essential cornerstone of effective security risk management. The 
Humanitarian Practice Network’s review of operational security 
management, for instance, stresses that acceptance ‘can and 
should be the foundation of all security strategies’ (HPN, 
2010: 56), and most NGOs (as well as the ICRC) have adopted 
acceptance as their principal and preferred security strategy, 
at least in theory (ibid.; Metcalfe, Martin and Pantuliano, 2011; 
Fast et al., 2011a and 2011b; Van Brabant, 2010; HPN, 2010). 
Whether recognition or adoption of the acceptance approach 
across the sector has really carried over into better security 
management in practice is unclear. A recent review of agencies’ 
understanding and implementation of acceptance concludes 
that, whilst most NGOs claim to base their security management 
strategies on acceptance, few have any explicit policies on how 
to operationalise this approach. Where these do exist, many 
fail to systematise or detail what acceptance consists of as a 
distinctive security management approach, and little has been 
developed in the way of monitoring mechanisms (Fast et al., 
2011b: 1). In short, ‘acceptance is neither well-conceptualized 
nor consistently operationalized by many NGOs’, with ‘little 
consensus on what acceptance means, what steps must 
be taken to gain acceptance, and how an organization can 
determine whether it is accepted in a given area’ (Fast et al., 
2011b: 1, 4). Thus, while most organisations have to engage 
in one way or another with local communities and other 
stakeholders to gain access and consent for their programmes, 
the kind of active, systematic and nuanced strategies that are 
arguably necessary to properly support acceptance remain the 
exception, with most agencies lacking not only basic policies 
and operational guidance but also the requisite financial 
and human resources (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010). A few 
of the larger agencies have invested in developing proactive 
acceptance approaches involving improved context analysis 
and more active and strategic stakeholder engagement 
and negotiation, but the majority approach is much more 
passive and ad hoc. This is often based on an assumption 
that acceptance from ‘the community at large’ will result 
automatically from the agency providing assistance and doing 
good work for a particular population (ibid.), or involves the 
transfer of risk to partner or subcontracted organisations as 
an easier alternative to resourcing and supporting more active 
acceptance-based security management. 
What operational guidance there is on acceptance acknow-
ledges that, however well planned and implemented, this 
approach cannot guarantee security (HPN, 2010: 56). Most 
agencies also rely on harder protective and deterrence 
measures to a greater or lesser degree, whether in response to 
changes in the local or wider security context or – as is often the 
case for UN agencies, private aid contractors and some NGOs 
– as their primary or default security management approach, 
sometimes more or less regardless of the actual security risks 
faced on the ground (Hansen, 2007: 49). The tensions and 
contradictions between the aspirations of acceptance and the 
realities of protection/deterrence measures are obvious: the 
most recent HPN Good Practice Review notes, for instance, 
how agencies’ acceptance and their ability to convey principles 
of non-violence and independence may be compromised by 
using deterrent measures such as driving with armed escorts 
or hiring armed guards, or by protective measures that weaken 
direct engagement and relationships with local stakeholders 
and make it easier for suspicion, resentment or hostility to 
take root, sometimes feeding local perceptions that aid actors 
are tied to particular belligerent groups (HPN, 2010: 56). 
As regards military assets, most humanitarian agencies have 
policies on the use of armed protection, often based on generic 
principles and guidance such as the IASC’s 2001 ‘Guiding and 
Operating Principles on Civil–Military Relationship & Use 
of Military Assets’, or joint agency guidelines developed at 
country level, such as the 2008 ‘Guidelines for the Interaction 
and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors 
in Afghanistan’ and the 2008 UN ‘Civil Military–Coordination 
Guidelines for Sudan’.14 For instance, the 2008 Afghanistan 
guidelines state that military or armed protection for 
humanitarian agencies or for specific humanitarian activities 
should only be used in exceptional circumstances in order 
to meet critical humanitarian needs. However, with most aid 
funding and activity focused on rehabilitation, reconstruction 
and state-building or peace-building activities, the majority of 
organisations that label themselves ‘humanitarian’ (both NGOs 
and private contractors) are also engaged in non-emergency 
assistance, and many willingly work directly with military and 
14 See http://www.unocha.org./what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-
CMCoord/publications.
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civil–military actors, such as the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams; most use armed protection and escorts, and often 
not as a last resort. The guidelines therefore beg important 
questions around what constitutes a ‘humanitarian agency’ 
and ‘humanitarian activities’ or, indeed, a ‘military actor’ in 
a context such as Afghanistan, and how this affects security 
management practice. 
In situations where their own acceptance and other security 
strategies or logistical capabilities prove insufficient, NGOs 
have frequently turned to the UN or international military 
organisations for additional security and other forms of 
direct support, resorting to the harder or more risk-averse 
protective and defensive responses and capabilities that 
characterise the UN’s and other political and military actors’ 
security management frameworks, such as the emergency 
evacuation of staff from a particular location. According to a 
recent study of UN integrated missions and the implications 
for humanitarian action, the attitudes and access of different 
agencies to the UN’s security and other logistical support 
are highly inconsistent, with differing views among non-UN 
humanitarian actors on the appropriateness of using UN 
civilian or military assets (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 2011: 
29) and varying and inconsistent support by different UN 
actors. There are no established policy frameworks to guide 
what non-UN agencies (or, indeed, the UN’s own humanitarian 
agencies) might expect or accept in terms of logistical and 
other security support from the UN’s various military and 
civilian actors. The ‘Saving Lives Together’ initiative has 
supported steps to strengthen collaboration between the 
UN and NGOs on security management, but progress has 
been slow (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; Steets et al., 2012; 
Metcalfe, Martin and Pantuliano, 2011). 
Research for this study in South Sudan found differing 
opinions about the extent to which the UN is responsible 
for the safety of expatriate NGO staff. Depending on which 
region NGOs are operating in, different UN policies appear 
to apply. For instance, in Abyei, an area of ongoing conflict 
between the Sudanese government and the SPLA, the UN 
reportedly assured all NGOs that they could take refuge in 
the fortified UN compound in the event of major threats. In 
Lakes State, violence is between local southern Sudanese 
actors and, on occasion, directed against foreign NGO staff. 
Unlike UN officials in Abyei, the acting head of UNMISS for 
Lakes State has repeatedly told NGOs that the UN would 
not support them in the event of violence against foreign or 
non-Sudanese staff. As a result, NGOs are unclear about the 
short- and long-term ramifications of what they consider to 
be inconsistent UN policy.
Agencies may decide to withdraw from particular situations 
when insecurity and other risks are seen to outweigh the 
imperative to stay. Yet few agencies appear to have formulated 
clear or accountable exit strategies or risk thresholds to support 
decisions to remain or leave (Metcalfe, Martin and Pantuliano, 
2011; Egeland et al., 2011). A Feinstein International Center 
consultation on humanitarian assistance in Iraq, for instance, 
found that agencies were split within and among themselves 
over whether to quit the country as humanitarian needs had 
progressively declined. The report observes that there are no 
shared criteria on the issue, with funding and other institutional 
imperatives further distorting critical decisions: ‘[w]hen it 
became clear that there was no major food or displacement 
crisis and only pockets of vulnerability among civilians, the 
issue was fudged for reasons of institutional survival … The stark 
choice was between cooption and irrelevance: for fear of losing 
UN vehicles en-route from Khartoum to Juba, Bor, South Sudan
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funds and contracts, many agencies found reasons to stay on, 
regardless of their particular mandate’ (Feinstein International 
Famine Center, 2004). Although many organisations did 
withdraw, there was ‘no discernible pattern among them in 
their approaches to security’ (Hansen, 2007: 48).
Mainstream commentary and guidance have focused on the 
management and mitigation of the most immediate operational 
security risks, with far less consideration given to other types of 
risk (Metcalfe, Martin and Pantuliano, 2011). Serious contextual 
risks might include critical developments such as a return to 
violent conflict, large-scale displacement or the collapse of 
markets and the rule of law; programmatic risks might include 
programme failure or doing harm by resourcing a war economy 
or empowering warlords; institutional risks, meanwhile, would 
include potentially substantial reputational and fiduciary 
liabilities (ibid.). The narrow focus on security risk management 
has meant that comparatively little attention appears to 
have been paid to how aid actors’ security strategies can 
themselves generate other security, contextual, programmatic 
or institutional hazards and risks (ibid.). The picture painted 
by mainstream operational guidance is that stronger security 
management frameworks and practices should ensure better 
access and improved and more effective engagement by 
aid agencies; while this assumption no doubt holds true up 
to a point, overall the realities of seeking and maintaining 
access and presence in insecure environments are a lot less 
certain and clear-cut. In practice, maintaining institutional or 
personal presence depends much less on the tidy formulae 
of security management frameworks than on the many critical 
compromises that are made by or result from organisations 
and individuals trying to resolve the basic tension between 
accepting risks and remaining safe. Access and presence 
may have been achieved, but only on certain conditions and 
frequently at the risk of creating, accepting or ignoring other 
significant risks and hazards. ‘Presence’ does not always 
equate with proximity: many international aid organisations and 
personnel may be physically or institutionally present, but at 
the same time essentially remote from their client populations 
and, indeed, from their own national and local employees. The 
findings of this study suggest that many of the hazards that 
affect international aid engagement in insecure or conflict-
affected environments stem from the basic conundrum of aid 
organisations seeking, maintaining or expanding their presence 
while simultaneously limiting key aspects of their proximity so 
as to reduce or minimise the exposure of international staff to 
security risks. What, then, does it really mean for aid actors to 
stay and deliver in challenging security contexts?
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The hazards that ensue from 
the increasing bunkerisation 
and detachment of senior aid 
managers from their agencies’ 
operations, local populations and 
the general context are multiple, 
far-reaching and cumulative, 
and are liable to increase as the 
degree of remoteness grows 
(Steets et al., 2012: 44). General 
awareness of the problems asso-
ciated with remote management 
has grown as the practice has 
proliferated across the sector 
(see, for instance, Norman, 2012; 
Abild, 2009; Egeland et al., 2011; 
Stoddard and Harmer, 2010), yet 
most agencies treat it as an ad hoc 
adaptation to adverse security 
conditions, without properly 
scrutinising or planning for it as a 
recognised or established feature 
of their presence and engagement (Egeland et al., 2011). As a 
consequence, the various hazards involved, if acknowledged 
at all, are more likely to be seen in isolation. Some – but by 
no means all – of these hazards are highlighted below. The 
intention is not to paint an unwarranted negative picture: aid 
agencies get much right in environments that are unquestionably 
challeng-ing and difficult. The purpose of this discussion is to 
broaden and deepen the risk agenda beyond the immediate 
preoccupations of operational security risk management. This 
inevitably entails a focus on the difficulties and dilemmas of 
engagement, rather than its positive achievements.
4.1 poor contextual knowledge and analyss and weak 
nformaton base to support programmng and decson-
makng
There is a well-rehearsed and well-recognised critique that aid 
agencies are weak on contextual understanding and analysis 
to support their programming in conflict-affected countries and 
complex humanitarian emergencies. While good situational 
knowledge and information would be considered a prerequisite 
for aid programming in any context, it is seen as all the more 
critical in volatile and risky political and security situations 
where the complexities of engagement and the consequences of 
flawed interventions are significantly heightened (see Collinson 
et al., 2002). Despite the aid sector’s growing expansion and 
investment in these environments and over two decades of 
rhetoric on the issue, however, good contextual knowledge 
among agencies remains as scarce as ever.15 
The reasons for this are often attributed to the ostensibly short-
term nature of humanitarian action, organisations’ failure to 
invest sufficient human and financial resources to support 
better information-gathering and analysis, the absence of 
suitable research tools and analytical frameworks and agencies’ 
failure to incorporate what contextual information and analysis 
they do have into their planning and programming. All of these 
obstacles would seem more or less amenable to institutional 
or technical ‘fixes’ of one kind or another, hence the repeated 
refrain for aid agencies to do something about them. Yet the 
findings of this project suggest that the problem is actually 
more to do with the behaviour and culture of aid actors. The 
physical and social distancing of many aid personnel from the 
local human and political context not only creates barriers to 
security hazards and threats, but also makes it difficult for 
them to appreciate or understand the people and societies that 
they are engaged with. Bunkered compounds, restricted and 
protected movement and short deployments all contribute to 
Chapter 4
The hazards of ‘stayng and delverng’ n 
challengng envronments 
UNHCR residential compound, Juba, South Sudan 
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15 This problem is not confined to the aid industry. In Afghanistan the 
remoteness of the military from the Afghan communities among which they 
operate has also been problematic in terms of cultural understanding and 
lack of language skills, compounded by the constant rotation of troops. 
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aid actors ‘substituting acquaintance for knowledge, activity 
for understanding, reporting for analysis, [and] quantity of 
work for quality’ (Cowper-Coles, 2011: 52).
This creates an immediate and obvious hazard for security 
management. Without any depth of experience in the 
countries where they are deployed and lacking the kind of 
accumulated understanding and knowledge of the social and 
political environment that might come from a longer and 
closer connection, many senior and expatriate staff – including 
security personnel – cannot gain the kind of detailed and 
comprehensive contextual understanding that, it is argued, 
is critical for effective security management. As Greg Hansen 
observed in Iraq, distance and dislocation in the aid community 
encouraged many international staff, donors and policymakers 
to treat insecurity as a ‘nebulous, generalized, persistent, and 
insurmountable challenge, rather than as a series of serious 
incidents, each of which can be analyzed, placed into (often 
localized) context, and used as a spur to adaptation’. Hansen 
suggests that aid actors’ inadequate understanding of the 
security environment might have become a rationalisation for 
reduced assertiveness, creativity and engagement, and for an 
‘astonishing lack of curiosity about the … context among some 
aid staff’ (Hansen, 2007: 53 and 22). As one interviewee for this 
study put it: ‘You get so many lenses that people use through 
which people see, or refuse to see. I don’t think it is a conclusive 
kind of thing. They all have this mental image of what they 
prefer to see. There are so many cultural stereotypes, and so 
much fear, fear to go out of their comfort zones’.
In terms of the overall quality and impacts of aid programming, 
the problem is far wider than just security risk management: 
there is hardly any aspect of aid activity which is not hampered 
in one way or another by poor situational knowledge. Without 
knowing and understanding the context, aid managers are 
unable to properly plan, monitor and assess the outcomes and 
impacts of their aid programmes and projects; cannot steer, 
support or gauge acceptance strategies effectively; cannot 
assess whether their or their partners’ activities might be 
doing short- or longer-term harm in particular places or at a 
wider level; cannot easily judge or will not know if they or their 
programmes, staff or partners are or might be co-opted or 
manipulated by belligerents or other political or military power-
holders; cannot negotiate effectively with external stakeholders 
for humanitarian access or for approval of their aid inputs 
and projects; are less likely to detect or control diversion and 
corruption in their funding and delivery chains; cannot recruit 
and deploy national or local staff with sufficient sensitivity to 
ethnic and other personal or social profiles; cannot properly 
filter, collate or judge the quality or bias of information or 
analysis provided by local or national staff or partners; and 
cannot properly scrutinise the suitability and credentials of 
partners and other subcontractors. Perhaps most importantly, 
they are more liable to overlook, misinterpret or misunderstand 
the security and protection needs of beneficiary populations. 
One of the most striking aspects of the security risk agenda 
and the approaches that it encourages is the extent to which 
these are focused on the risks for agencies themselves, rather 
than risks to civilians within the host population. Strategies and 
mechanisms that might be effective for protecting aid agencies 
do not necessarily protect civilians in the same context, and 
the security and access of aid agencies often wins out over the 
security of civilians.
With many organisations having failed to invest in more 
systematic approaches to context analysis, a common default 
position is instead to claim reliance on the supposedly superior 
situational knowledge of national and local staff. Recent 
guidance on security management and acceptance states 
that national staff have a key role to play in contextualising 
messages, identifying stakeholders and acting as organisational 
interlocutors (see, for instance, Fast et al., 2011b: 8; HPN, 
2010: 58); a recent Acceptance White Paper produced by 
an inter-NGO project on security management notes that 
‘[n]ational staff with the ability to communicate in culturally 
appropriate ways … are crucial to success as international 
staff often lack experience and knowledge of the culture or 
language of their country of assignment (Fast et al., 2011b: 11, 
citing Carle and Chkam, 2006: 14). The Humanitarian Practice 
Network’s updated Good Practice Review on operational 
security management lists a long and highly demanding set of 
descriptors for the analytical and other competencies required 
of agency staff if they are to succeed in implementing an 
active acceptance approach, including the ability to analyse 
changing political and security conditions, the ability to 
map out key actors and establish a wide network with key 
stakeholders and the ability to systematically use and update 
tools such as security audits and plans (HPN, 2010: 69). This 
looks a tall order, particularly for local and national employees 
who will often have been recruited on the basis of other skills 
and experience or particular ethnic or other identity criteria. 
It also goes to the heart of the deep inequalities within the 
aid industry between a minority (10% or less) international 
managerial elite – the overwhelming focus of the huge 
investment in security over the last couple of decades – and the 
majority national (and regional) workforce. While usually aware 
that their local staff will often know more than expatriates, in 
reality it is still rare for agencies to fully acknowledge or draw 
upon this indigenous knowledge base in any systematic or 
strategic way, tending instead to depend on local staff simply 
to use their local knowledge to facilitate and support particular 
projects at the local level. In the survey of aid workers’ attitudes 
to security risk management conducted for the Stay and 
Deliver report, a number of national staff complained that they 
were not listened to by international colleagues who ‘project 
themselves as experts’; the report notes that ‘it is easy to see 
how such international attitudes and obstacles to national 
staff consultation on security matters could amount to missed 
opportunities at best and dangerous missteps at worst’ and 
that the aid organisations interviewed ‘who had demonstrated 
successful secure access all made strong use of their national 
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colleagues’ (or partners’) information and analysis, consulted 
them as co-equals … and often had nationals in senior leadership 
or analytical positions in the security area’ (Egeland et al., 2011: 
45–46). In Afghanistan, this research found that the views 
and perspectives of local Afghan NGO workers often differed 
substantially from their international colleagues, with a focus 
on the local context and their own lives and priorities rather 
than on broader organisational objectives. 
Often lacking comprehensive situational knowledge and 
understanding among key staff, and without effective systems 
or frameworks for providing context analysis, many agencies 
end up relying on security-related information and ‘intelligence’ 
to guide their programmes and operational decision-making. 
Access to this type of information is highly varied, however, 
with different organisations and individuals having different 
positions and capacities as regards what information is 
collected, shared or accessed, and who with. Variations in 
organisational policies also affect the type of intelligence that 
is sought and communicated, and considered actionable. The 
Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO, now part of the International 
NGO Safety Office (INSO)), for instance, restricts its security-
related information and advice to member NGOs, and relies 
largely on its own analysis; official intelligence organisations 
often do not report ‘credible’ threats to the supposed targets. 
At the same time, intelligence is becoming increasingly 
privatised as other organisations and for-profit companies 
disseminate, for a price, highly detailed security reports that 
have obvious sources in the intelligence community. 
This stream of largely disconnected and decontextualised 
security data and alerts can clutter, obscure and complicate 
accurate understanding and analysis of complex security 
environments. While the level of detail contained in security 
reports does not necessarily correlate with increased accuracy 
in prediction, it does serve to reinforce the perception of a 
constant and active threat, potentially fuelling paranoia or, 
conversely, desensitising the target audience to real threats. 
The constant circulation of detailed threat reports risks creating 
a fear of exposure that can paralyse an operation; while aid 
agencies do face real access difficulties in many places – if not 
direct threats to the safety of their employees – perceptions 
of increasing danger are much more widespread. These 
perceptions are reinforced by generic forms of field security 
training and the growing influence of security professionals 
within the aid sector. As one expatriate aid worker in South 
Sudan put it to this study: 
NGOs are now more risk averse. No doubt about it. 
Part of it is probably liability, insurance, risk of being 
sued. Part of it is that a security industry has grown up 
within the NGO industry. They all have security advisers 
now, all ex-military and obviously they look at things 
from a military point of view and they have to justify 
themselves. 
4.2 Weakened relatons and engagement wth clent 
populatons and external stakeholders and heghtened 
rsks of dong harm
In conflict-affected and chronically insecure countries such 
as Afghanistan and South Sudan, aid actors have become 
integral and often powerful players in the political economies 
of the communities and societies concerned. As argued 
by Collinson and Elhawary (2012: 4), important aspects of 
‘humanitarian space’ are determined by the interplay of 
Queuing outside WFP compound, Bentiu, South Sudan 
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interests among a variety of political, military, economic 
and other actors, organisations and institutions, including 
aid agencies and affected populations. In theory, the larger 
established international aid agencies have long recognised 
the importance of understanding and managing their relations 
with external stakeholders, whether for the purposes of ‘doing 
no harm’ (Anderson, 1996), to distance themselves from donor 
governments or other political and military actors (Reiff, 2011), 
to negotiate access (HPN, 2010; Egeland et al., 2011) or as a 
key component of acceptance strategies (Fast et al., 2011b). 
A recent White Paper on acceptance by the USAID-funded 
‘Collaborative Learning Approach to NGO Security Management’, 
for instance, advocates an ‘active’ approach to acceptance 
that takes account of different degrees of acceptance by 
different stakeholders, including beneficiary communities, host 
governments, local government officials, religious authorities, 
traditional leaders and militant groups (ibid.). Yet, in practice, 
the majority of agencies lack any systematic or reliable approach 
to understanding or engaging with the interests and agendas 
of other stakeholders, a problem significantly compounded 
by the social and physical detachment and weak contextual 
knowledge of many international workers. 
To the extent that they seek to do it at all, the main rationales 
for agencies purposefully analysing and engaging with other 
actors often appear limited to the imperatives of achieving or 
improving access, staff security and local aid delivery. This is in 
conspicuous contrast to the wider and more outward-looking 
concerns of the ‘do no harm’ and civilian protection agendas 
that were much more to the fore a decade ago, and arguably 
reflects the extent to which international aid actors have become 
preoccupied with their own security and operational priorities 
rather than those of client populations (Collinson and Elhawary, 
2012: 11). The Acceptance White Paper referred to above, for 
instance, takes as its starting point a definition of acceptance 
as ‘cultivating and maintaining consent from beneficiaries, 
local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders’ as ‘a 
means of reducing or removing potential threats in order 
to access vulnerable populations and undertake programme 
activities’. The objective of stakeholder analysis is therefore 
‘to accurately identify and analyze the motives, attitudes, 
capabilities and relationships of actors who might influence 
programmatic success, including security’ and ‘help determine 
the appropriate parties to engage in dialogue and negotiation 
in order to enhance staff security’ (Fast et al., 2011b: 8). 
This focus on the immediate priorities of access and security 
risks eclipsing any attempt to properly comprehend or account 
for the bigger picture in terms of the implications and impacts of 
agencies’ actions and activities, whether at local or wider levels 
(Collinson (ed.), 2003: 9; Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). It is all 
too easy for senior managers to assume that, as long as access 
is sustained and programmes are continuing, their agency 
and its activities are ‘accepted’, and that all is well (Fast et al., 
2011a). Yet, whilst an aid agency may be valued or ‘accepted’ 
by certain power-holders, this does not necessarily mean that 
all members of the community are happy. No ‘community’ is 
undifferentiated, and relations at community level are likely 
to be strained and volatile in situations of insecurity and 
vulnerability (du Toit et al., 2005; Collinson, 2011) – as is typical 
in Afghanistan, where patronage and the control of economic 
and political resources by local and regional elites sustain 
sharp inequalities at the village level (Pain and Kantor, 2010). 
Chronic insecurity and vulnerability can generate extreme local 
grievances, often fed by rumour and innuendo (Collinson (ed.), 
2003: 5). In Afghanistan, community consultations carried out 
for this project and previous consultations by the Feinstein 
International Center in 2005 and 2006 revealed widespread 
and entrenched alienation vis-à-vis aid actors and the overall 
development process (Donini, 2006). Vilification of aid actors 
by politicians and the media and overwhelmingly negative 
perceptions of NGOs and other agencies at the local level have 
contributed to a serious credibility crisis for aid actors (ibid.). 
Since the majority of agencies do not assess or monitor local 
perceptions of their presence and activities (Fast et al., 2011a: 
11), and since their senior managers’ direct presence on the 
ground is often limited, they may often remain largely unaware 
of how negatively they are viewed among the majority of their 
client populations (ibid.). In this study, Afghan community 
respondents described an almost total lack of contact with 
foreign aid workers. According to one focus group participant 
in Nangarhar: ‘The foreigners do not have contact with people 
generally. If they make contact with people, they come to the 
district administration and then ask the Maliks and elders to go 
to the district administration and visit the foreigners’. Likewise, 
a Helmand farmer complained: ‘The foreigners are inside of 
district house – they are not coming out of the district centre. 
They meet a few elders there and no one else is allowed to meet 
them, so those people benefit who are meeting them, not the local 
people, because they don’t have any contact with local people’ 
(PTRO, Helmand 2011). Aid agencies’ access to communities 
was widely seen as predicated on the relationships of their staff 
and partners with local power-holders, local NGO workers and 
officials, and was frequently seen as (actively or inadvertently) 
feeding corruption and inequality by channeling aid resources 
through local gatekeepers (see also Fishstein and Wilder, 2012; 
Farrell and Gordon, 2009). Recipients were commonly identified 
by elders, who created lists of who was ‘deserving’ of help and 
directed and controlled assistance. Many respondents pointed 
to elders, shuras, district administrators, local commanders or 
police chiefs diverting or taking a share of aid resources and 
monopolising aid-related contracts to benefit their own families 
or other interests (PTRO, Helmand 2011). Some respondents 
advocated a gradual removal of support altogether (PTRO, 
Balkh 2011), while others suggested that direct implementation 
and house-to-house distributions by foreigners would be a 
better alternative than working through Afghan representatives 
and gatekeepers (PTRO, Helmand 2011). 
The greater the distance and detachment of senior aid person-
nel and the greater their ignorance of local political and social 
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realities on the ground, the greater the risk that their agencies 
or partners will do harm through their engagement and 
relationships with external stakeholders. A recent global review 
of humanitarian access strategies conducted for ECHO reports 
how agency staff ‘run the risk of developing “tunnel vision” 
by focusing on project implementation and losing sight of the 
bigger picture’, often ‘with an attitude that the humanitarian 
imperative trumps all other concerns, so that almost anything 
seems acceptable as long as lives are being saved’; this, in 
turn, ‘may lead them to accept compromises for short-term 
access gains that undermine humanitarian standards and 
principles in the long-run’. In the case of Somalia, for instance, 
the report highlights that many aid workers interviewed felt that 
humanitarian agencies had accepted too many compromises 
in order to keep operating in the country, and that agencies 
have often used lengthy and largely unmonitored chains of 
contracting and subcontracting and effectively tolerated and 
supported a situation in which aid diversion and humanitarian 
assistance have become important pillars of the war economy, 
benefiting armed groups, so-called gatekeepers, security firms 
and kidnappers (see also Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012). 
Reliable monitoring, the report notes, has been difficult if not 
impossible, with international managerial staff generally unable 
to visit project sites and local monitors subject to intense 
pressure, with several killed (Steets et al., 2012). 
Where the primary objectives of aid interventions are not 
simply to deliver material assistance but to purposefully alter or 
‘stabilise’ the social and political order in the interests of peace- 
or statebuilding, the potential liabilities associated with weak, 
distorted or biased relationships with external stakeholders 
are particularly acute. In counter-insurgency contexts such 
as Helmand, ‘quick impact’ reconstruction and development 
projects designed by distant military and aid planners have been 
founded on arguably simplistic 
and naïve assumptions about the 
relationship between short-term 
development initiatives, local per-
ceptions and associated political 
and security dynamics (Collinson, 
Elhawary and Muggah, 2010). 
Where the political settlement is 
contested, these so-called ‘hearts 
and minds’ projects can have 
the adverse effect of creating 
instability by legitimising one 
party over another (Goodhand 
and Sedra, 2010).
These hazards are compounded 
by the increasingly common prac- 
tice among UN and other inter-
national agencies of devolving or 
outsourcing access negotiations 
and strategies to partners, sub-
contractors and national or local 
staff. Recent reviews of humanitarian negotiations and the 
implications of UN integrated missions by the Humanitarian 
Policy Group note that UN humanitarian agencies and many 
of their NGO partners have worked under an assumed policy 
of ‘no contact’ with certain non-state armed actors, including 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. UN 
leadership of humanitarian negotiations with such groups has 
significantly diminished since 9/11, particularly at senior levels, 
and few humanitarian agencies pursue structured negotiations, 
with many avoiding any direct contact by subcontracting to 
national NGOs (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 2011; see also 
Jackson, 2012). In Afghanistan, some UN agencies and NGOs 
have limited their direct engagement on the ground or have 
operated a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’, whereby national staff 
are engaging with local-level Taliban, but without the explicit 
authorisation or support of their organisation. This lack of direct 
engagement by senior international staff is seen as limiting 
humanitarian advocacy and undermining efforts to obtain 
security guarantees to access populations in need, as well 
as ethically questionable when responsibility for negotiating 
access is delegated entirely to the local level. As Jackson 
argues, the practice of devolved, ad hoc and unmonitored 
contact and negotiation risks being inconsistent, precarious 
and potentially dangerous for the local humanitarian workers 
involved (Jackson, 2012). 
4.3 securtsed and prvatsed ad presence and 
delvery
The securitisation of aid has become a major defining factor in 
the operating environment of aid agencies, both in the sense 
of the co-option of aid actors into wider security agendas and 
through measures connected with the physical security of agency 
staff (Donini, 2006: 24). Since 9/11, Western-led stabilisation 
Expatriates shopping, Kabul, Afghanistan 
©
 S
an
ds
to
m
20   
HPG Commissioned Report CommIssIonEd REpoRT
approaches have exerted a powerful and pervasive influence 
over aid policies and UN engagement in conflict-affected and 
other fragile states, including Afghanistan, Sudan and South 
Sudan. Western governments and multilateral institutions 
have introduced ‘integrated’, ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole-
of-government’ approaches, while ‘integrated missions’ (or 
‘integrated peace operations’) have sought to create greater 
coherence between the UN’s multiple components within 
an overarching political–strategic framework that includes 
development and humanitarian capacities (Eide et al., 2005; 
Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010). On the ground, this 
has led to significantly increased interaction between military 
and security actors and civilian entities. In Afghanistan and 
Iraq, military and civilian actors worked together within PRTs 
to provide relief and reconstruction support, including ‘quick 
impact’ projects and other ‘hearts and minds’ activities. The 
hope (or, rather, assumption) has been that these activities 
would perform a necessary short-term security function, while 
also enhancing the space for longer-term development. 
Donor policies that are purposefully intended to securitise 
aid delivery have created new opportunities for aid actors 
to expand into – or ‘stay and deliver’ in – conflict-affected 
environments, but in order to exploit these opportunities many 
agencies have either placed themselves under an international 
security umbrella (see for instance Hansen, 2007; Donini, 
2006), or have progressively securitised their own presence 
in order to manage and mitigate the security risks involved. In 
short, aid actors have become key participants in militarised 
international interventions and, as such, have simultaneously 
militarised themselves so as to remain operational in these 
contexts. According to Duffield, ‘[w]hen militarisation is 
coupled with concerns over psychological stability, insurance 
requirements, including aid agency fears of litigation over lax 
security procedures, a powerful … technology for changing 
behaviour and shaping new forms of subjectivity has come 
into existence’ (Duffield, 2010: 463). In reference to the 
proliferation of guarded aid compounds in Sudan in 2010, 
Duffield observes the irony that, ‘after decades of war and 
dislocation … militarised buildings are among the first material 
or built expressions of “peace”’ (Duffield, 2010: 455–56).
The real or perceived programmatic and institutional hazards 
of engaging in stabilisation and ‘integrated’ interventions 
have been recognised and debated by aid agencies for the 
past decade. They revolve principally around the flawed 
assumptions and approaches of political and military actors, 
such as the efficacy of ‘hearts and minds’ activities, and 
around concerns that stabilisation and UN integration have 
suborned the priorities and imperatives of human security 
and humanitarian action to political and military objectives 
(Collinson and Elhawary, 2012; Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 
2011). In the context of these debates, and specifically as 
regards concerns around security risks, attention has focused 
particularly on the assumed heightening of the security risks to 
humanitarian and other aid workers and assets resulting from 
their or other agencies’ association with political and military 
elements of international interventions. A recent independent 
study conducted for the UN Integration Steering Group found 
no clear evidence of a direct link between UN integration 
arrangements and attacks on humanitarian workers, but 
found that the majority of security analysts believe that the 
association with political actors can be an additional risk 
factor in particular environments, especially high-risk contexts 
where the UN mission is implementing a political mandate 
that is opposed or contested by one or more of the conflict 
parties (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 2011: 2). In response, 
some NGOs have started withdrawing from UN humanitarian 
coordination fora in Afghanistan, and are threatening to do so 
in other contexts as well (ibid.: 4).
Much less debated is the flip-side of aid securitisation, 
resulting from aid agencies’ own protective and deterrent 
security measures (see Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, 
2008); indeed, to a large extent this has deliberately been 
kept out of any open discussion or scrutiny, with agencies 
finding it much easier to blame external actors for the 
perceived assault on ‘humanitarian space’ and their ability 
to operate in these environments. Yet it is clear that, in some 
situations, the hard security measures employed by aid 
agencies can heighten their exposure to targeted attacks. 
As observed in a recent wide-ranging review of humanitarian 
access strategies, ‘[w]here humanitarian offices resemble 
military bases, it becomes difficult for both civilians and 
armed groups to distinguish between civilian aid workers and 
legitimate military targets’; according to one interviewee in 
the review: ‘You need an armed convoy because it is insecure. 
You get attacked because you have armed police with you. 
So, you will need more armed convoys to protect you from 
attacks. After a number of attacks, the whole area becomes 
a no-go zone and you are unable to make the contacts that 
could guarantee your safety’ (Steets et al., 2012: 44).
In Afghanistan, many NGO respondents made reference to the 
military mentality that they have seen take hold with an influx 
of ex-military security advisers into UN agencies and NGOs, and 
the proliferation of private security providers contracting their 
services to these agencies. Several were keen to emphasise 
the ‘new thinking’ that sought risk mitigation officers from 
outside of the uniformed professions. Within INSO (formerly 
ANSO), for instance, NGO experience is given greater credence 
than a security background, and some UN staff suggested 
that the type of people hired when UNDSS was created and 
expanded would not be considered for a position today.16 
The fact remains, however, that the aid sector has opened 
up a fast-expanding market for security advice and training 
that many from the security services and private security 
companies have been quick to exploit. AKE, for example, 
which describes itself as a ‘client-focused risk mitigation 
company’, has a dedicated page for NGOs on its website 
advertising a range of services to aid agencies, including the 
16 Interview, Kabul, November 2011. 
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development of security policies, security training and the 
brokerage of insurance packages for staff deployed in risky 
environments. DynCorp International Inc. – listed as twelfth in 
a recent ranking of US government contractors and partners 
– describes itself on its main homepage as providing ‘[r]apid 
response capabilities in emergencies, world-class post-
conflict and transition programs, and sustainable solutions 
for long-term development, with an emphasis on building 
local capacity’; its subsidiary, DI Development, is described as 
having the capability ‘to assess, plan and execute the creation 
of major population support facilities in times of distress and 
emergency’ (DynCorp International Inc., 2011, at http://www.
dyn-intl.com/development.aspx). 
As Peter Singer, a leading commentator on the private military 
and security market, has noted, private military and security 
provision offers aid agencies a means to strengthen their 
protective or deterrent security capacities as an alternative 
or addition to state or international police and military 
cover (Singer, 2006: 69). But whereas established police 
and military entities are easily identifiable and have clear 
lines of authority, the private security market – including the 
sub-market in NGO security contracting – remains all but 
entirely unregulated and includes multiple and often shadowy 
international and local firms whose activities are subject to 
little or no screening, sanction or control (ibid.). Likewise, 
the steps taken across the sector to guide and regulate 
engagement with military actors have not been matched 
with comparable guidelines or regulations relating to aid 
agencies’ use of private security and military firms. The extent 
of contracting between humanitarian actors and these firms is 
much greater than is generally recognised, and aid agencies 
are reluctant to openly acknowledge it in their own practice. 
The private military market, Singer observes, is to a large 
extent hidden: most contracting is ad hoc and unaccountable, 
and there are no agreed guidelines on how aid agencies 
should relate to these firms (Singer, 2006, also citing Van 
Brabant, 2004; see also Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, 
2008). Singer’s research identified only three humanitarian 
agencies that had formal documents on how their employees 
should relate to private military firms and their staff, and one 
senior humanitarian expert interviewed only knew of one 
organisation that had detailed oversight guidance for its staff, 
including rules of engagement and procedures for handling 
weapons (Singer, 2006: 70).
In the interest of legitimising their businesses, many of the 
larger firms are keen to advertise their ties to aid agencies, 
while NGOs are more inclined to hide or downplay their 
relationships with these companies for fear of tarnishing their 
public image (Engler, 2010). Singer reports that the sensitivity 
of the issue meant that, in the course of his research, most 
interviewees from the humanitarian sector chose to stay 
anonymous (Singer, 2006: 70). Although difficult to uncover, 
Singer identified more than 40 different contracts between 
humanitarian actors and private military firms for services 
including armed guarding and escort and security logistics 
support. While much of the market is dominated by the bigger 
international players, such as ArmorGroup and DynCorp, 
agencies also regularly turn to smaller and/or local security 
providers, about which they often know very little. Inevitably, 
given the contexts concerned, there is the risk that local 
and some international military and security firms will be 
connected directly or indirectly with criminal, political or 
armed actors, including militias and other armed elements, 
warlords, protection rackets, kidnapping networks or drug 
cartels, but most NGOs lack the capacity or systems to screen 
the firms they hire. Singer reports that the only screening 
mechanism he found was ‘word of mouth’ (ibid.: 75). 
The associated hazards are obvious. Most agencies would 
be aware of the reputational risks involved; indeed, the 
continuing secrecy that surrounds the issue represents an 
attempt to reduce or mitigate these risks. More immediately, 
the risks of aid agencies inadvertently empowering criminal or 
armed groups or fuelling war economies are significant, and 
all the greater for the lack of oversight or screening involved 
and the secrecy that surrounds this area of contracting. At 
a broader level, there is an ethical hazard involved, with 
aid agencies playing a role in the privatisation of security in 
contexts where the civilian population is as much or more at 
risk from violence and insecurity. As Singer argues:
 
The privatisation of security risks is reinforcing internal 
divisions in weak states between those who enjoy 
security and those who do not. When security is a 
profit-driven exercise – a commodity to be bought and 
sold – the wealthy are inherently favoured … That this 
should take place in the humanitarian sector is not 
a happy development and certainly not one that fits 
well with humanitarian ideals. Determining who enjoys 
protection and who does not is a political act; when 
they hire PMFs, humanitarian actors are taking upon 
themselves decisions that were once the prerogative 
of the state … Not only are the worst threats deflected 
from privately protected areas, but those portions of 
society come to rely on declining, unstable or non-
existent public means (Singer, 2006: 77, citing Huggins 
and MacTurk, 2000; see also Engler, 2010).
The contracting of private military and security companies 
can be seen as part of a wider tendency among aid agencies 
– particularly UN agencies – to contract out operational 
activities to commercial providers in response to insecurity 
and as a means of circumventing internal security, human 
resources and insurance conditions and restrictions. A recent 
review of humanitarian access strategies notes that the use 
of private contractors to transport supplies through insecure 
areas is a common practice that is clearly justified in terms 
of humanitarian access and aid efficiency, but also suggests 
that agencies’ reliance on private contractors has become 
excessive in some countries, with many UN agencies in 
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particular reducing their recruitment of national staff and 
using private contractors instead. The review research team 
report that one field office it visited was entirely staffed by 
employees of a private firm (Steets et al., 2012: 46). 
4.4 Herarches of protecton and rsk transfer wth 
remote management
Under so-called ‘remote control’ arrangements, key decision-
making is retained by international managers who are relocated 
in a safe and usually distant location, while national and/or 
local staff and subcontracted organisations remain in situ to 
deliver assistance and implement operations on the ground, 
usually with little in the way of direct monitoring or support 
and often in conditions of considerable insecurity and volatility. 
Less extreme ‘remote management’ arrangements involve a 
partial or temporary delegation of some decision-making and 
other managerial responsibilities to national staff with some 
support and oversight from (physically removed) international 
staff. ‘Remote support’ and ‘remote partnership’ entail more 
conscious and planned strategies intended to transfer decision-
making and authority to national staff or local organisations 
(see Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2008; Abild, 2009).
Whether intentionally or not, these different forms of arm’s-
length aid management all involve the effective transfer of 
security risks and associated liabilities from international 
staff to national and local staff or subcontracted and partner 
organisations and their personnel. While this is increasingly 
acknowledged by the more established international agencies, 
few have reportedly taken any steps to plan for when and what 
forms of outsourcing, remote management or risk transfer 
practices are appropriate or justified for different situations 
and contexts (Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 2010; Egeland 
et al., 2011), and despite growing awareness of the significant 
ethical issues that these practices raise there is as yet little 
discussion and no common framework to support decision-
making that can properly accommodate proper attention 
to the moral dilemmas involved (Van Brabant, 2010). As 
acknowledged by the Stay and Deliver report, ‘[d]espite its 
commonplace and often protracted usage … very few agencies 
have systematically or strategically planned for when, whether, 
and how to employ this practice as an effective programmatic 
adaptation, as opposed to an ad hoc response’ (Egeland et 
al., 2011, citing Stoddard et al., 2010). The report notes the 
findings of a high-profile 2006 study of trends in providing 
aid that identified only one example of a humanitarian agency 
that had any written guidelines for situations of remote 
management (ibid., citing Stoddard et al., 2006). 
The authors of the Stay and Deliver report suggest that 
the unequal exposure of international and national/local 
personnel to security risks may not necessarily be indicative 
of neglect or unethical approaches by international agencies, 
but it may well result from contextual ignorance and false 
assumptions on the part of their (often distant or ‘bunkered’) 
senior managers. They may wrongly assume, for instance, 
that national staff will be at lower risk of attack because 
of their knowledge of the local context and lower visibility. 
These assumptions entirely overlook the specific security 
and other hazards that national and local workers may face 
owing to their particular ethnic, religious or other identity 
or affiliations or resulting from their position as agency 
representatives and gatekeepers in contexts where aid inputs 
represent an important and often contested component of the 
local political economy (Egeland et al., 2011: 40; Abild, 2009; 
UN cargo flight, Bor, South Sudan 
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Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012). The assumption that local 
aid workers are well-placed to assess what are ‘acceptable’ 
risks and respond appropriately ignores the potential for 
their judgements concerning personal risk to be influenced 
by financial or other competing priorities and incentives 
that encourage risk-taking. It may also assume too much as 
regards their knowledge or understanding of local security 
conditions which, in volatile and uncertain environments, will 
often be flawed or incomplete.
At a sector- or system-wide level, a charge of unethical neglect 
towards national and local employees and contractors across 
the aid sector may not seem entirely unwarranted. Despite the 
fact that national and local personnel represent over 90% of 
aid workers in the field and consistently suffer far higher rates 
of security incidents and fatalities compared to internationals, 
agencies’ staffing policies and guidelines rarely consider the 
distinct threats faced by their national staff (Fast et al., 2011b: 
12, citing Rowley, Burns and Burnham, 2010: 4). Indeed, 
while their overall risk exposure is substantially higher, 
national and local staff usually have less access to security 
training and protective or other security measures or to the 
security-related information and briefings that are provided 
for international personnel, and they are usually excluded 
from the additional support arrangements that are assumed 
necessary for international staff, such as hazard pay, R&R leave 
and counselling (Van Brabant, 2010; Egeland et al., 2011, citing 
Stoddard, Harmer and Haver, 2006). Aid workers employed by 
local partner NGOs or other subcontracted entities are likely 
to receive even lower levels of security support through their 
organisations. Despite the growing practice of subcontracting 
or outsourcing the implementation of their aid operations, 
the role and responsibilities of international agencies as 
regards the security of their local operational partners or local 
contractors has hardly been addressed (Van Brabant, 2010; 
Egeland et al., 2011: 44). Research for the Stay and Deliver 
report suggests, overall, that international humanitarian 
organisations have ‘significant room for improvement in 
tackling the inequities between international and national aid 
workers in terms of providing adequate security resources, 
support, and capacities’, with the majority of national aid 
workers surveyed feeling that they were more exposed and 
under a greater burden of risk than international staff (Egeland 
et al., 2011: 3). The tendency to regard remote management as 
a capacity-building exercise for national staff, many of whom 
have years of experience of working for aid agencies and 
considerable expertise in the management and technology 
of aid programming, only reinforces the unequal relationship 
between national and international aid workers.
Whilst the stay and deliver agenda is concerned with gaining 
or maintaining agency access to insecure contexts, the means 
by which many aid organisations achieve this rests on security 
arrangements that effectively exclude the vast majority of 
their more exposed front-line implementers from access to 
the protected and exclusive aid ‘archipelago’ enjoyed by 
their more senior international personnel. Indeed, some of 
the most crucial aid implementers – including many involved 
directly in the logistics side of aid delivery – are not recognised 
as ‘aid workers’ as such by the sector’s international elite. 
In many complex emergencies, including South Sudan, air 
transport and cross-country trucking form the backbone 
of humanitarian operations. Without this support, the aid 
programme would collapse, and yet the risks facing pilots 
and trucking operators are all but entirely neglected; in 
South Sudan, for instance, this study found that helicopter 
pilots working for UNMIS were almost entirely dismissive of 
UN security briefings, during which UN staff read prepared 
statements which referred only to numeric classifications of 
risk.17 As one pilot put it: ‘We can refuse to fly if the helicopter 
is not okay. But we cannot say we cannot fly because the SPLA 
will kill someone’. When asked if helicopter crews received 
background information about security conditions before a 
flight, he replied: ‘We just get a task. We get all the clearances. 
And we go’. Sources within the UN reported to the study that 
UN flight crews were routinely detained and harassed by the 
SPLA, and several helicopters have been shot at.18
With the physical and social detachment between international 
staff and national field staff and the stark differences in their 
relative exposure to risk and access to protection and other 
benefits comes a high potential for mutual resentment and 
mistrust. As Van Brabant observes, ‘[a]nybody who spends 
some time in the Western-dominated aid world cannot but 
be astonished by the pervasive levels of distrust: distrust 
between people within agencies, between agencies, between 
agencies and their alleged “beneficiaries”’. Abild reports how, 
in the case of Somalia: 
Both the Somalis and expatriates that I met described 
the cynicism born from the Nairobi-Field divide in very 
clear terms. In the ‘Nairobi Village’ – the third biggest 
UN centre in the world after New York and Geneva – 
international staff work and live relatively comfortable 
lives, many of them making considerable amounts of 
money in the process. By contrast, in Somalia, local 
staff, who actually implement the programs, and who 
are subject to pressure from many sides and live in 
very difficult conditions, are paid far less. It thus comes 
as no surprise that these stark differences in existence 
reality foster cynicism and mistrust (Abild, 2010: 12).
In Juba, representatives of major international donors and 
senior members of the government live in large compounds 
serviced by two-lane hard-top roads, while outside local 
Sudanese are crowded into mud-walled huts and garbage 
fires burn along rutted roads. Observing the defended aid 
compounds of South Sudan, Duffield notes how these are:
17 The United Nations employs a standard numeric identification for levels 
of risk. For example, regions classified as ‘Category 3’ are described as 
‘Transitional’, while a ‘Category 4’ denotes a high risk.
18 South Sudan interviews, April 2011.
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exclusionary and disem-powering in their workings 
and appearance … Even within the … aid archipelago 
… aid workers themselves are distinguished according 
to their relative mobility or stasis. While those on 
international contracts are able to move and circulate, 
local aid workers, like beneficiaries are … immobile 
onlookers (Duffield, 2010: 455–56).
Hansen reports how, in Iraq, working relationships became 
increasingly strained as agencies shifted to low-profile and 
remote modes of operating, with high levels of distrust 
between Iraqi and international staff based in remote offices, 
and communal tensions affecting relations among national 
and local staff (Hansen, 2007). These internal divisions are 
compounded by the real and perceived physical, social and 
psychological distance between many international staff and 
their national and local counterparts, often reflected in the 
conspicuously contrasting lifestyles, values and behaviour 
of international aid personnel and sometimes arrogant or 
derogatory attitudes towards national staff and populations 
– attitudes that can easily take root where foreign aid workers 
have little or no contact with local people. Donini notes how, in 
Afghanistan, the top-down and sometimes arrogant externality 
of the aid enterprise has led to a dominant–dominated 
humanitarian dialectic and a lack of appreciation for the 
coping mechanisms of local communities (Donini, 2006: 14). 
Respondents for this study in Afghanistan described the 
aid and development system as increasingly populated by 
individuals with a technocratic worldview who have seemingly 
little interest in the country or its people.19 In this context a 
posting can be viewed as a career step, and the task seen as 
a compartmentalised technical problem isolated from other 
issues. Several international respondents reflected negatively 
on the presence of pure careerists who showed no ‘real’ 
interest in what they were doing. Even for those who do take 
an active interest in outcomes, efforts are often hampered by 
short rotations, which encourage a more detached approach.
4.5 Weakened control of ad delvery chans and 
dstorted ad programmng and coverage
Threat perceptions, risk mitigation strategies and an expansion 
in the subcontracting of aid implementation have effectively 
driven a retreat of donors and lead UN agencies and many 
international NGOs from the point of aid delivery, and 
increased reliance on subcontracting and proxy monitoring 
and reporting in lengthy aid delivery chains (see for example, 
ICAI, 2012: 7). At the same time, predefined ‘problems’ 
and standard ‘solutions’ that are largely disconnected from 
the context encourage ideologically and politically driven 
assumptions in place of grounded evidence or consultation 
with client populations in the planning and assessment 
of aid programmes. Eide is particularly critical of the US 
search for ‘simplistic solutions to complex problems’ based 
more on ‘wishful thinking’ than local realities (Eide, 2012: 
229–30). In the resulting gap between intent and outcome, 
the real results and impacts of project interventions often 
disappear from view and oversight. In Afghanistan, Donini 
reports ‘yawning’ information and communication gaps, with 
agencies seemingly ‘unable to explain in a credible manner 
what they are achieving with the funds entrusted to them by 
the international community’ (Donini, 2006: 12). The review 
of humanitarian access strategies complains similarly of the 
loss of control and oversight, risks of aid diversion and poor 
programme quality that can result from remote management 
(Steets et al., 2012: 57).
In any aid and development environment containing compe-
tition for funding, the system conditions organisations to 
maximise their competitiveness in relation to others in order to 
remain operational and maintain a presence, and expectations 
about performance potentially push implementers to what in 
reality becomes external programme control from funders. For 
organisations lacking core funding and working on a project 
basis, donor decisions and preferences are critical in terms of 
overall staffing and operational capacity; as agencies seek to 
expand their presence and operations in these programmes, 
they inevitably become part of wider donor-led political 
projects (Barakat, Deely and Zyck, 2010: 313). Organisations 
that view or portray themselves as neutral or apolitical may 
have to choose between cancelling a project, conforming to 
demands made by major donors or presenting their funding 
proposals and reports in such a way as to maximise the 
chance of gaining funds. 
Under these conditions, most agencies will seek to protect their 
bottom line, and just as local communities and gatekeepers 
can adjust their narratives to become ‘appropriate clients’ 
(Mosse, 2005), so aid organisations consciously construct an 
image of being good performers and appropriate implementers 
in order to secure funding. In its recent review of DFID funding 
in Afghanistan, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact 
(ICAI) found that ‘organisations in the delivery chain have a 
vested interest in reporting success’ (ICAI, 2012: 14). As one 
respondent observed, ‘the more facts are spun the less they 
will be respected … But a movie that does not make money does 
not get a sequel’.20 There is thus a structural incentive to create 
and manage a certain image in relation to implementation and 
outcome, and the greater the separation between the point of 
intent and the point of implementation, the greater the risk of 
distortion. Controlling the narrative becomes important, and 
this is not only about what message or information is projected 
but also about what information is not shared. The control of 
self-perceived negative information at different levels within 
agencies can constitute risk mitigation in terms of how reliable 
the organisation is seen to be by donors as a performer, thus 
reducing potential programmatic risk. As long as this is accepted 
or not seriously questioned by donors, the logic of competition 
drives a need to reduce any potentially negative messages: a 
perception of success can be maintained regardless of actual 
19 NGO interview, Kabul, October 2011. 20 Interview, Kabul, May 2011.
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programmatic impact and effect. This, in turn, undermines the 
capacity for lesson-learning and the adjustment of programmes 
and projects that might have had negative outcomes. In their 
review of DFID Afghanistan, for example, ICAI found that no 
comprehensive assessment of ‘aid leakage’ had been done and 
that, out of the 25% of interviewed organisations even willing 
to provide an assessment, all of them assessed fraud and 
corruption as ‘non-existent or trivial’ in their own programmes 
(ICAI, 2012, 14–15).
Strengthening accountability for outcomes and impacts 
requires a closer link between the point of intent and the point 
of implementation, detailed understanding of the local context 
and transparent, evidence-based monitoring and assessment 
– all of which are difficult to achieve remotely. Numerous 
contractors, agencies and organisations consciously try to 
bridge this gap in a number of ways, such as ensuring a 
presence at distribution points, signing public agreements with 
communities or arranging alternative sites where communities 
and expatriates can interact directly; some are looking at 
technical solutions using satellites, mobile phones and GPS 
tracking. But with operational aid activities increasingly 
subcontracted or outsourced, the level of responsibility and 
accountability for outcomes becomes increasingly unclear; 
as put by a contractor interviewed for this study, as soon as a 
task has been subcontracted, the outcome is no longer their 
responsibility.21 If a contractor or implementing partner does 
not have any responsibility in relation to the overall objective 
or the outcomes of their particular project, implementation 
will most likely come to reflect this. By withdrawing from the 
point of implementation, liability for negative outcomes can be 
avoided by claiming ignorance: reference to the security risks 
and obstacles involved in monitoring outcomes provides an 
alibi for not knowing; meanwhile, any vested interests in the 
status quo may seek to exaggerate the scale of the danger.
 
Distortions in the priorities, coverage and modalities of aid 
resulting from donors’ political objectives within stabilisation 
and state-building interventions are well-recognised and often 
clear to see. For example, Pain’s analysis of donor funding to 
Afghanistan reports that:
 
of the top 10 bilateral donors, who from 2002–2009 
have provide nearly 75% of aid, eight of them also have 
a military presence through ISAF and OEF and aid linked 
to military objectives that does not meet the criteria of 
ODA and nor is it systematically or reliably reported … 
There is … indicative evidence of selectivity in terms 
of how funding is geographically allocated between 
provinces, which is further confounded by differential 
levels of ‘development’ spending by military actors. 
Waldman (2008: 12) drew attention to the disparities 
in PRT (Provincial reconstruction team) spending with 
more insecure provinces (Uruzgan and Kandahar) 
receiving $150 per person and less insecure receiving 
substantially less ($30 per person in Faryab, Daikundi 
and Takhar). On the basis of an analysis of Ministry of 
Finance data, he also suggested that there are higher 
levels of spending by government and donors in more 
insecure provinces – Helmand receiving more than 
$400 per capita and substantially less in what have 
been seen as secure provinces – about $50 in Sari-Pul, 
Ghor and Wardak … There is certainly a perception by 
people in the north that there is a greater level of donor 
funding to the south, where there is greater insecurity 
and more opium, and this was given as a contributory 
reason to return to opium poppy cultivation (Pain, 
2012: 11; see also Poole, 2011).
By following the money, at least to areas that they can 
access, many aid agencies’ operational programmes have 
UNOCA gate, Kabul, Afganistan 
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been similarly distorted, driven by their donors’ objectives 
rather than assessed needs on the ground. This compounds 
other distortions in the overall coverage or prioritisation of 
aid across different areas or groups resulting from security 
conditions and more basic logistical or arbitrary factors, such 
as geographical distance, the location of airstrips and other 
transport hubs, the condition of transport links to particular 
locations or simply historical accident in terms of where 
particular organisations and their partners happen to be 
established. The greater the effective detachment of donors 
and aid managers from the field, and the more limited and 
restricted agencies’ presence is on the ground, the higher the 
risk that these distortions will go unrecognised or ignored, 
and that substantial humanitarian and other assistance and 
protection needs in parts of the host population will not be 
met. There is little accountability for not meeting needs that 
have not been identified in the first place. 
Agencies’ actions and responses are liable to be further distort-
ed by purposeful adaptations or curtailments in programme 
and project focus and objectives to suit the imperatives of 
security risk management. The very low-profile programming 
seen in contexts such as Somalia and Iraq represents an 
extreme example, but they are almost certainly just one end of 
a spectrum of self-censorship that results in certain forms or 
sectors of programming being favoured over others. Food, for 
instance, is a lot more difficult to deliver through low-profile 
approaches than vaccines. Hansen reports how, in Iraq, an 
experienced MSF staffer acknowledged the tensions between 
security and the humanitarian imperative, observing that, 
while large-scale high-profile humanitarian programmes were 
untenable, it was still possible to perform ‘individual acts of 
medical humanitarianism’ such as emergency surgery and 
support to medics through remote operations (Hansen, 2007: 
50). Here, he reports, the humanitarian presence diminished 
in scale, but also became ‘hidden’ to the extent that it was 
more or less invisible; aid workers used the terms ‘covert’, 
‘surreptitious’ and ‘furtive’ to describe humanitarian agencies’ 
low-profile operations. This, Hansen argues, provided greater 
safety for humanitarian workers, but at a cost to acceptance 
by local populations (ibid.: 52).
The hazards of self-restriction or self-censorship in the interests 
of minimising security risks are more obvious as regards public 
advocacy. The recent review of humanitarian access strategies 
reports that most agencies have reduced their public advocacy 
to a minimum, seeing this as necessary so as not to jeopardise 
their operations on the ground. Where agencies prioritise 
access and security for material relief over the protection needs 
of civilian populations, and thus remain silent in the face of 
violence or human rights abuse, ostensibly benign judgments 
around programme ‘criticality’ become deeply problematic.
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Maintaining an aid presence in 
challenging security environ-
ments is full of contradictions 
and ambiguities. While rates of 
violence against aid workers 
have increased over the past 
decade, the empirical evidence 
is unclear as to how, and in 
what way, aid work has actually 
become more dangerous, with 
the higher numbers of reported 
incidents also reflecting greater 
numbers of aid personnel overall 
and probably increased rates of 
reporting. Areas of real danger are 
not necessarily where defensive 
and deterrent security thinking 
and risk management measures 
are most pervasive. Nevertheless, 
there is a widespread perception 
among international aid agencies 
that working conditions in these 
and other situations of conflict and insecurity are becoming 
more dangerous, especially in relation to humanitarian or 
emergency situations. 
Despite the real or perceived increase in the dangers involved, 
there has been an unprecedented expansion into these 
contexts at every level, in terms of geographical reach, 
funding availability, agencies involved and the range and 
complexity of their responsibilities. This has been driven 
by a new and unprecedented form of international political 
and military patronage of the sector, with the drive towards 
integrated missions, international stabilisation and the ‘war 
on terror’ producing vast and highly politicised and militarised 
flows of international aid into unstable environments such 
as Afghanistan. Given the significant amounts of money 
involved, many agencies – especially those involved in 
state- and peacebuilding – have been willing to work under 
this more partisan umbrella, while others have sought to 
emphasise distance and independence. There has also been 
an expansion in private and for-profit security companies and 
consulting organisations working in challenging environments. 
These new actors have added to the feeling of fragmentation 
and competition within the aid sector. The turn towards 
remote management as a risk-transfer strategy among more 
established agencies has added to this fragmentation, with a 
proliferation of partnership and subcontracting arrangements 
involving an increasing reliance on national aid workers 
and local NGOs. For international NGOs, private contractors 
and consultants, not to be ‘present’ in today’s challenging 
environments not only affects financial viability, but can 
also impact on brand loyalty and claims to an international 
humanitarian capacity. For UN agencies, the willingness of the 
UN to stay despite periodic attacks on its staff and premises is 
a reflection of its new international strategic role. 
This institutional expansion has been coterminous with 
the proliferation of a raft of institutional, managerial and 
architectural security measures stemming from insurance 
requirements, employer duty-of-care concerns, standardised 
security protocols and field-security training. Perceptions and 
calculations regarding security conditions are increasingly 
interpolated by security and insurance actors that have vested 
interests in fostering uncertainty and anxiety; the number of 
international aid workers who have been in simulated car-
jackings, for instance, must far outnumber those who have 
faced the real thing. While encouraging aid workers to take 
more responsibility for their actions, much field security 
training generates a culture of fear and anxiety that promotes 
conformity to externally imposed rules and requirements. 
Meanwhile, approaches to stress and trauma emphasise 
the therapeutic qualities of the fortified aid compound as 
a necessary refuge from uncertainty and unpredictability. 
When one mixes in contractual issues, security protocols, 
insurance requirements and fears of litigation, it is clear that, 
while aid organisations may be willing to stay in challenging 
environments – and hence accept more risk – the reality is 
the increasing bunkerisation of anxious international aid 
managers and a corresponding turn to remote management.
Chapter 5 
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Paradoxically, therefore, while agencies have expanded their 
presence in conflict zones, this has meant the progressive 
withdrawal of many core expatriate personnel into fortified 
aid compounds, secure offices and residential complexes 
and other forms of self-contained and privately guarded 
gated communities. Reflecting Western societies that are 
themselves becoming more risk-averse and security 
conscious, the fortified aid compound has become one of the 
signatures of the contemporary aid sector. This, in turn, has 
contributed to the growing physical and social remoteness 
of international aid personnel from the societies in which 
they work. Often enforced by restrictive security protocols, 
‘bunkerisation’ has been accompanied by the proliferation 
of remote management techniques by many agencies as aid 
managers attempt to administer or evaluate programmes 
from a safe distance through national and local field workers, 
subcontracted intermediaries and new technologies. While 
organisations are accepting risks to maintain a presence in 
challenging environments, these are being transferred out 
and down increasingly long, diverse and fragmented delivery 
chains to a wide range of national, local, community, regional 
and private actors.
In many respects, the contradiction between the expectation 
that international aid workers accept more risks – no matter 
how residual or well-managed – and the countervailing 
pressures to limit exposure seems irreconcilable. The 
constellation of organisational, ethical, personal and financial 
difficulties involved in working in challenging environments, 
and the fundamental tension between ‘staying’ and ‘staying 
safe’, suggests that bunkerisation and remote management 
are an unstoppable trend. Commercial remote sensing and 
the increasing use of social media, together with advances 
in imaging and mapping software, potentially solve a lot of 
problems, even if ‘presence’ becomes an increasingly virtual 
reality. In this respect, it is sobering to consider that remote 
aid and remote war (e.g. drone attacks and human terrain 
mapping) use similar, if not identical, sensing technology, 
mapping tools and social algorithms as the growing field of 
humanitarian remote sensing.
The aid industry has yet to systematically discuss the wider 
implications and possible consequences of these trends. 
Finding new and more productive avenues will depend first 
and foremost on recognising and acknowledging the basic 
challenges and contradictions that underlie the contemporary 
aid presence in countries such as Afghanistan and South 
Sudan. The tensions between organisational and individual risk 
acceptance and ‘resilience’ cannot be resolved simply through 
recourse to better or smarter operational security management 
techniques, however well designed and implemented. Indeed, 
narrowing the focus to supposed technical and managerial fixes 
risks drawing attention away from the more fundamental or 
higher-order dilemmas and hazards that define the messy and 
uncertain realities of being present and engaged in complex and 
challenging security environments, and therefore risks painting 
too positive a picture of what is really involved in gaining or 
maintaining organisational access and operations. Recognising 
the liabilities associated with ‘staying and delivering’ depends 
on agencies adopting a broadened risk agenda that is not 
confined to the immediate preoccupations of ostensibly 
manageable security risks, but which encompasses attention 
to the host of interconnected challenges and hazards involved, 
including hierarchies of protection and risk exposure and 
cultures of distrust among staff and beneficiaries, unmonitored 
local programming, asset transfer, securitised agency presence 
and delivery and weak, unaccountable or harmful relationships 
with external stakeholders.
When viewed and scrutinised as a lived reality, the con-
temporary aid enterprise in countries such as Afghanistan 
and South Sudan is revealed as a highly adaptable but also 
fragmented social arena in which the actions of individuals 
and organisations are driven by the interplay of subjective 
anxieties and mixed motives associated with the various 
risks and opportunities that these environments present: 
staying means adapting; adapting means compromising; 
and what compromises are made depends on the diverse 
and frequently conflicting interests and perceptions of all 
the actors involved. In these highly uncertain environments, 
the most important and urgent challenge for aid managers 
may not lie in implementing tidy security risk management 
frameworks, but in reaching a clearer understanding and 
recognition of the difficult balance between the opportunities 
and liabilities of adapting in order to stay and deliver. Staying 
and delivering in challenging environments is inherently risky 
on all fronts, and these risks cannot be managed or avoided 
through the progressive retreat of the industry’s key decision-
makers into the ‘protected’ and separated arenas of remote 
management.
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Annex 1
strategc hazard assessment framework for ad provders n nsecure envronments
Since the 1990s, aid agencies have significantly expanded the 
reach and ambitions of their engagement in conflict-affected 
or chronically insecure contexts. Seeking to sustain their 
presence and operations in these environments has meant 
greater exposure to a host of security and other risks and 
hazards. Although many aid organisations are institutionally 
prepared and incentivised by humanitarian, reputational 
or financial interests to take on these risks, and although 
many individual aid workers are willing to work in uncertain 
and high-risk conditions, these enabling tendencies are in 
tension with powerful counter-imperatives that encourage 
risk-aversion. 
This hazard assessment framework is intended to support 
critical debate and discussion that openly acknowledges 
the uncertain, difficult and sometimes irresolvable nature 
of the hazards that organisations or their employees may 
face. It is designed to be used as a dynamic and continuing 
prompt for aid actors to pose critical questions, highlight 
challenges and seek to identify and examine the dilemmas 
and trade-offs involved. The key questions and issues that the 
framework highlights centre on the implications of the remote 
management of aid delivery, and the associated physical, 
social and institutional distancing of senior or international 
aid personnel from the contexts of their agencies’ aid inputs 
and operations and from local populations. 
The framework is intended to be applicable and adaptable to 
a diverse range of decision-making and operational levels and 
situations. These might include:
• Workshop settings.
• Operational decision-making at project/programme/higher 
levels.
• Programme and project monitoring and evaluation.
Aims and objectives 
Core mandate/mission 
Broader principles and priorities 
Short/long-term objectives 
Macro/micro objectives 
Contractual obligations 
Financial imperatives 
Human resources 
Branding 
What  is the organisation/programme/ 
project intending and achieving  in 
practice? 
Saving lives? Supporting livelihoods? 
Building institutions? Building peace? Providing 
infrastructure? 
What mitigating 
action or 
measures could be 
taken, with what 
implications and 
risks? 
Reduced presence or 
withdrawal? Changes to 
security management policy 
and practice 
(acceptance/protection/ 
deterrence)? Internal policy 
change (e.g. recruitment 
and personnel 
management, insurance, 
information management, 
donor reporting, advocacy 
strategy)?   
What does 
engagement or 
‘presence’ entail? 
International staff bunkered? 
Rapid staff rotation? 
Use of private security? 
Internal/external risk transfer 
and internal hierarchy of 
protection/working 
conditions? 
Restricted/censored 
programming or advocacy? 
Reliance on military 
protection or working to 
donor/government/military 
priorities or controls? 
 
Evidence? 
Evidence? 
Ev
id
en
ce
? 
What are the implications for presence 
and delivery? 
Poor information for decision-making? Poor contextual 
knowledge and analysis? Distrust or disconnection between 
staff/organisations? Fictitious reporting? Poor control and 
monitoring of aid delivery chains? Securitised presence? 
Fuelling corruption or economies of violence? Disconnected or 
inappropriate social or cultural behaviour? Negative local 
perceptions? Risks to local populations overlooked?  
Evidence? 
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• Development of high-level or context-specific agency 
strategy and objectives.
• Facilitation of discussions and communication with internal 
and external audiences.
Whatever the context in which it is used, the quality of 
reflection, discussion and associated decision-making sup-
ported by the framework will depend crucially on the quality 
and transparency of supporting evidence.
The framework seeks to challenge aid actors to consider 
critically how their aims and objectives relate to what 
they and their partners are seeking to achieve on the 
ground. Whether and how aid actors achieve their aims and 
objectives is determined by complex interactions of individual 
and institutional interests, imperatives and influences at 
different levels, with decision-making often highly reactive 
and subjective and involving high levels of uncertainty. How 
organisations or their staff adapt to working in insecure and 
complex operating environments is often out of step with 
their assumed or professed standards, principles and key 
objectives. Institutional pressures and imperatives interact 
with programming objectives and priorities which are often 
unclear. Assessments of risks and hazards vary substantially 
between individuals and different organisational levels, 
agencies and contexts, and are affected by subjective cultures 
of risk perception and risk management practices. 
The framework does not assume that decision-making will 
necessarily be rational, objective or consistent, or that 
different aid actors are likely to reach similar conclusions 
or make similar decisions with regard to the key issues 
that it highlights. By encouraging aid actors to consider 
what action or measures might be taken to mitigate or 
respond to particular hazards, the intention is to support 
critical and informed consideration of the priorities and 
potential trade-offs involved, with an appreciation that many 
hazards cannot be easily eliminated. Engaging in challenging 
security environments means adapting; adapting means 
compromising; and what compromises are made depends 
on the diverse interests and perceptions of all the actors 
involved. The overarching intention of the framework is to 
help aid managers and their personnel reach an informed 
understanding and recognition of the difficult balances to be 
struck between the opportunities and liabilities of adapting 
in order to ‘stay’ and ‘deliver’ in these contexts. 
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1. south sudan
Dr Carol Berger was the principal Research Assistant (RA) for 
the South Sudan component of the research. 
man detals of the feldwork 
Apart from two months either on return visits to the UK or 
taking leave, the main South Sudan fieldwork was completed 
between November 2010 and November 2011. A short return 
visit was also made in April 2012. The research was largely 
completed in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, and Rumbeck 
in Lakes Province. Besides rural areas, time was also spent in 
other urban areas including Wau, Bor and Bentiu. 
overall condtons
The period of fieldwork covered a time of dramatic change 
in South Sudan. In a January 2011 referendum, South Sudan 
voted in favour of secession from Sudan and, six months 
later, on 7 July 2011, the region gained its independence as 
the Republic of South Sudan. As part of the transition, the UN 
Mission in Sudan was renamed the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS). For the international humanitarian community, the 
period marked both an increase in IO/NGO presence, but 
also an effective reduction in agency reach due to worsening 
security. This insecurity was the result of internecine fighting, 
militarised groups opposed to the South Sudan government, 
rising levels of armed assault and robbery by uniformed 
police and soldiers and, in the early part of 2012, rising 
border tensions between Sudan and South Sudan. IOs/NGOs 
became involved in the delivery of food aid for war-affected 
civilians. Efforts were also initiated to negotiate access to 
disputed territories where conditions for local populations 
were deteriorating.
There are few roads in South Sudan and supply of basic 
goods and services is poor. There are also important seasonal 
constraints on travel. During the rainy season (April–October), 
travel throughout South Sudan is extremely difficult. This 
necessitates pre-planning regarding movement and places of 
domicile during the affected months. 
In terms of logistics, the international community is 
independent of the society in which it operates. The UN, for 
example, has created and sustains its own transport system. 
This includes fixed-wing aircraft, transport and rapid-response 
helicopters and vehicles for both heavy goods transport and 
the movement of UN staff. Access to this transport system is 
controlled and primarily reserved for employees of IOs/NGOs 
and other agencies recognised by the UN as contributing 
to the aid effort in South Sudan. Given the reliability of this 
system, however, government officials and employees of state 
ministries and departments are also included, as are, on a 
discretionary basis, individuals granted permission by senior 
UN staff to board UN vehicles or aircraft.
methodology 
The main research methodology comprised formal and 
informal interviews supplemented by participant observation 
among aid agencies and contractors operating in areas and 
regions considered to pose a security risk. Documents were 
also collected and a photographic archive built up. 
Fieldwork in South Sudan focused on exploring the social 
relationships between IOs/NGOs, regional or East African aid 
workers, internationals and the indigenous community. While 
these social relationships – or the absence of them – are 
important in themselves, entering into them was an important 
way of facilitating movement in an otherwise difficult logistical 
environment. 
In general, access to aid agency and private company staff 
was not a problem. This can be explained by Dr Berger 
having prior experience in South Sudan, which aid workers 
considered useful and important, and the research focus 
on risk and security being highly topical. Interviews were 
conducted among a wide range of individuals, including 
internationals in senior policy-level positions; NGO and IO 
staff from East Africa in both lower- and higher-level positions; 
nationals working for indigenous and international agencies; 
and internationals and nationals working for private security 
companies/consultancy firms.
An important factor in conducting interviews and participant 
observation was proximity and chance. The sites of contact 
included aircraft within South Sudan; at airports, while waiting 
for flights; at transport hubs, while waiting for land transport; 
at tent compounds and company residences in main centres; 
and, where pre-planning had been carried out, in offices 
and residences. In addition to interviews and observation, 
Participant observation including such things as staying 
overnight at NGO residences; travelling with de-miners to 
field sites; accompanying NGO staff on lengthy road journeys 
to remote field sites; attending the UNMISS weekly security 
briefings for NGOs in Rumbek, Lakes State; supporting the 
Carter Centre in a one-day workshop aimed at preparing 
newly arrived staff members to South Sudan; and facilitating 
recruitment of female volunteers from a secondary school in 
Rumbek for the Red Cross.
Due to the high turnover of international staff, a significant 
part of the research relied on observation and contacts with 
nationals of East Africa and South Sudan.
Annex 2
Research methodology: extracts from feld reports
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materal collected 
During the approximately ten months of fieldwork, more than 
100 interviews were conducted, together with numerous 
informal conversations and opportunities for participatory 
observation. While the research took place mainly in Juba and 
Rumbeck, Bentiu, Bor and Wau were also visited.
Donor organisations consulted included USAID, the US Embassy, 
DFID and the Swiss Embassy. From the UN family, interviews 
were conducted with UNMISS, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR and UNDSS. 
IOs/NGOs included Oxfam, Non-Violent Peace Force, IRC, Red 
Cross, G4, Healing the Healers, Awake South Sudan, Samaritan’s 
Purse, NGO Forum, USIS and the Carter Centre. Church groups 
included the Catholic Church, Evangelical Church, and Episcopal 
Church of South Sudan. Besides individual consultants, 
private contractors interviewed included Civicon, AECOM, PAE 
and Deloitte. Bulgarian, Ukrainian, US and Canadian pilots 
contracted to UNMISS were also interviewed. As well as 
government officials from the Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Youth and Sport, representatives from the SPLA, the Boy Scouts 
movement, Traders’ Union and South Sudan Chiefs were also 
contacted. Finally, a number of interviews with South Sudanese 
journalists and press officials were completed. In April 2012 
two roundtable workshops on the preliminary research findings 
took place in Juba. One was aimed at IOs/NGOs, while the other 
was made up of South Sudanese employed by local NGOs. 
In addition to interviews and observatory material, more than 100 
documents relating to security matters (daily situation reports, 
incidences of insecurity, staff advisories) were collected. 
Local partner
Over a one-month period, between December 2011 and 
January 2012, a South Sudanese research team – part of the 
Juba-based Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Capacity 
Building Consult, South Sudan (SMECOSS) – was contracted 
to carry out individual and focus group interviews in Juba, Bor 
and Wau. 
The team carried out interviews on the question of local 
understandings of the role of the international humanitarian 
community. The team targeted different interest groups, 
including youth, labourers, women, the educated and returnees 
(both from abroad and within East Africa). The interviews 
aimed at identifying whether people were conscious of the 
NGO/IO presence and what their feelings about that presence 
were. Members of SMECOSS attended the Juba workshops.
The complete version of the South Sudan End of Fieldwork 
Report can be found at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/global-
insecurities/esrc-dfid.
Addtonal south sudan research
In September 2012, Diana Felix da Costa was contracted for a 
six-week period – between 1 October and 14 December 2012 
°V to conduct further research in Juba and in Jonglei State 
(in Bor and Boma). This research was also ethnographically-
driven and involved international, national and local staff 
of UNMISS, UNDSS, UN agencies and INGOs. In addition to 
interviews, the research sites included locations frequented 
by the aid community, such as compounds, restaurants 
and bars. In total, over 30 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with some 16 organisations, in addition to a 
number of informal discussions and observations. Diana Felix 
da Costa’s field report can be found at http://www.bristol.
ac.uk/global-insecurities/esrc-dfid.
2. Afghanstan 
The principal Research Assistant (RA) for the Afghanistan 
component of the research was Dr Karl Sandstrom. 
man detals of the feldwork 
Interspersed with short periods back in UK or on leave, some 
nine months of fieldwork were completed between November 
2010 and April to December 2011. A short follow-up visit was 
made in April 2012. The research, which was mainly completed 
in Kabul, was supplemented by short visits to Mazar-e Sharif, 
Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat. 
overall condtons
Central Kabul is dominated by the fortress-like constructions 
of foreign military, diplomatic and UN agencies. Movement 
within Kabul was undertaken on foot or by car or taxi 
between meetings at aid compounds or restaurants and cafes 
frequented by foreigners. Regarding flights out of Kabul, a 
major donor allowed the researcher to fly with their flight 
system to research locations in other parts of the country. The 
research in Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat was 
hosted by NGOs, private contractors or ISAF. Travel outside 
Kabul was often subject to last-minute cancellations due to 
the changing security environment. In general, low-profile 
movement was the chosen approach in all research sites, 
using non-military vehicles. 
Access to aid agencies was sometimes problematic. While 
international NGOs were relatively open, it was more difficult 
to get access to their Afghan staff. UN organisations, moreover, 
sometimes required vetting and clearance from New York. This 
involved frequent delays. While some donor organisations 
were approachable, private contractors also insisted on vetting 
and the approval of USAID, the main funder. Eventually, a 
working relationship was established with several contractors. 
In general, gaining access required a good deal of effort 
and follow-up. A final point concerns the strong patriarchal 
culture of Afghanistan, which limited interaction with female 
respondents.
methodology 
The main research methodology comprised formal and, 
especially, informal interviews supplemented with participant 
observation among aid agencies and contractors operating 
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inside and outside of Kabul. Documents were also collected 
and a photographic archive compiled. Besides interviews, 
participant observation within the aid industry in Afghanistan 
often hinges on gaining access through the ‘gatekeepers’ that 
are able to get people on the security lists that accompany 
most parties and social gatherings in order to restrict the levels 
of attendance. The research also benefitted from extensive 
discussions with Afghan researchers at the partner organisation, 
the Peace Training and Research Organisation (PTRO). 
materal collected 
During the approximately nine months of fieldwork, more 
than 90 interviews were conducted, together with numerous 
informal conversations and opportunities for participatory 
observation. While most of the research was done in Kabul, 
supplementary visits were made to Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, 
Jalalabad and Herat. Besides individual diplomats, donor 
organisations interviewed included GIZ, DFID, USAID, the 
World Bank and the EU. Interviews with IOs/NGOs involved 
ICRC, TLO, ANSO, the Halo Trust, SCA, CRS, CARE, DDG, TAF, 
StC, ACBAR, Afghan Red Crescent, Merlin, Action Aid and 
DACAAR. Interviews within the UN system included UNODC, 
UNAMA, IOM, UNDSS, WFP, UNOPS, UNICEF, Habitat, UNHCR 
and UNOCHA. Besides individual security consultants, private 
contractors contacted included PKF Auditors, FLAG, AKE, 
DAI, CADG, Black and Veatch and SIGAR. Regarding the 
military, besides individual PRT members, staff at ISAF were 
interviewed. Finally, the insurance companies Hiscox, Miller 
and AKE were contacted.
During April 2012, with the help of the Agency Coordinating 
Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the local partner, PTRO, and 
the UN, three workshops where held in Kabul to pilot the 
Workshop Framework (see below). These were for international 
NGOs, national NGOs and UN agencies respectively. 
In addition to interview material, a substantial number of 
security-related documents were collected, including more 
than 100 embassy security briefs, ANSO weekly security briefs 
and other miscellaneous items relating to agency operating 
policies, contractor intelligence and aid security. In addition, 
nearly 700 ANSO incident reports were collected, together 
with substantial material on aid flows. Numerous photographs 
relating to the security environment in Afghanistan have also 
been filed.
Local partner
In addition to the research carried out by Dr Sandstrom, 
information was collected on local perceptions of the 
international aid effort by the Kabul-based Peace Training and 
Research Organisation (PTRO). National and local researchers 
conducted in-depth interviews with 158 respondents across 
a sample of districts in Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Nangarhar and 
Helmand provinces. The districts were chosen to give a wide 
range of aid presence. The interviews, carried out in September 
2011, were based on open questions to let the respondents 
develop their answers independently. Respondents included 
local state officials, maliks, mullahs, teachers, NGO workers 
and a range of other categories. The researchers were 
instructed to inform each respondent that the questions were 
unrelated to any aid and development organisation and that 
no benefit or disadvantage would come from participation. 
The questions themselves were jointly developed by PTRO 
and Dr Sandstrom as part a capacity-building input.
Hazard Assessment Framework 
As part of the impact plan, a Hazard Assessment Framework 
was developed in Afghanistan. The framework is intended to 
encourage aid and development actors to actively engage 
with some of the issues emerging from the field research. In 
piloting this framework, three workshops were held in Kabul in 
April 2012. Their purpose was to present NGOs with the results 
emerging from the research, together with an opportunity for 
a select group of NGOs and UN agencies to provide feedback 
and input into the framework. A revised version of the Hazard 
Assessment Framework was provided to ACBAR for training 
purposes, and later presented at a research stakeholder 
meeting in London. 
The complete version of the Afghanistan End of Fieldwork 
Report can be found at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/global-
insecurities/esrc-dfid.
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